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REASSESSING SELF-DEALING: BETWEEN NO
CONFLICT AND FAIRNESS
Andrew F. Tuch*
Scholars have long disagreed on which of two rules is more effective when
a fiduciary engages in self-dealing. Some defend the “strict” no-conflict
rule, which categorically bans self-dealing. Others prefer the “flexible” and
“pragmatic” fairness rule, which allows self-dealing if it is fair to
beneficiaries. The centrality of this debate cannot be overstated: corporate
law as a field is fundamentally concerned with self-dealing by fiduciaries.
Yet a lack of firm data means that this debate has dragged on for decades,
with no end in sight.
This Article makes a simple but powerful point: the entire debate is
somewhat misguided because, in operation, the difference between the two
regimes is not as important as scholars generally assume. This is best seen
by comparing the operation of the United Kingdom—which continues to
employ the traditional no-conflict rule—with the United States, which
adopted the fairness rule. The no-conflict and fairness rules share a common
structure: they require strict loyalty but provide exceptions or cleansing
devices that save fiduciaries from liability. Only the no-conflict rule allows
companies to adopt their own exceptions. Based on this analysis, neither
rule is self-evidently stricter or more pragmatic. In fact, examining the
fiduciary rules in operation, including the exceptions that companies actually
adopt and directors actually use, reveals that they are quite similar in
operation. Both task neutral directors with policing directorial self-dealing.
This finding underscores the need for scholars and policymakers alike to
focus not on the choice between no conflict and fairness but rather on the
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best use of exceptions or cleansing devices. The availability of proof of
fairness as a cleansing device in the United States occasionally matters—but
far less than commentators have claimed. It is often irrelevant because of its
severity, rather than relevant because of its leniency. More attractive
exceptions are usually available to self-dealing directors. This finding also
complicates the dominant narrative holding that U.S. law significantly
weakened as it evolved from no conflict to fairness; far from rejecting a
stricter U.K. law, U.S. law came more closely to resemble U.K. law in
operation.
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INTRODUCTION
Corporate law is fundamentally concerned with self-dealing—the
expropriation of corporate wealth by fiduciaries.1 Self-dealing can involve a
1. See Simeon Djankov et al., The Law and Economics of Self-Dealing, 88 J. FIN. ECON.
430, 430 (2008) (“[T]hose who control a corporation, whether they are managers, controlling
shareholders, or both, can use their power to divert corporate wealth to themselves rather than
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favorably priced loan or exchange of property, the payment of excessive
compensation, or the outright theft of corporate assets.2 In fact, any
transaction between directors or officers and their corporation constitutes
self-dealing since it pits fiduciaries against the corporation they are obligated
to serve.3
Scholars have long disagreed over which of two fiduciary rules is more
effective for addressing self-dealing. Some scholars defend the “strict” noconflict rule, which categorically bans self-dealing by directors.4 Others
prefer the “flexible” and “pragmatic” fairness rule, which allows self-dealing
if it is fair to the corporation and its shareholders.5 Proponents of this
approach claim that the pragmatic fairness rule better distinguishes between
beneficial and harmful self-dealing.6 The debate has dragged on for decades,
beyond corporate law and across the common law world.7
This Article challenges a central assumption underlying the debate: that
the rules operate differently. In practice, the difference between these rules
sharing it with the other investors.”); Simon Johnson et al., Tunneling, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 22,
22 (2000).
2. See Luca Enriques et al., Related-Party Transactions, in THE ANATOMY OF
CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 145, 145 (Reinier Kraakman
et al. eds., 3d ed. 2017) (“Self-dealing typically refers to purchases or sales of assets, goods,
or services by related parties . . . .”); Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, A Survey of Corporate
Governance, 72 J. FIN. 737, 752 (1997) (referring to “managerial self-dealing, such as outright
theft from the firm, excessive compensation, or issues of additional securities . . . to the
management and its relatives”); see also Djankov, supra note 1, at 430–31 (listing forms of
self-dealing). This Article focuses on self-dealing by directors, including those with
significant voting power but not on nondirector controlling shareholders.
3. Fiduciary doctrine focuses on transactions directly between a corporation and its
directors as well as those with a corporation in which directors “are in any way interested,
whether because they benefit personally however indirectly, or because they are subject to a
conflicting duty.” L. C. B. GOWER, THE PRINCIPLES OF MODERN COMPANY LAW 479 (2d ed.
1957).
4. See, e.g., Victor Brudney, Corporate Governance, Agency Costs, and the Rhetoric of
Contract, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1403, 1410 (1985); Evan Criddle, Liberty in Loyalty: A
Republican Theory of Fiduciary Law, 95 TEX. L. REV. 993, 999 (2017); Harold Marsh, Jr.,
Are Directors Trustees?: Conflict of Interest and Corporate Morality, 22 BUS. LAW. 35, 35–
48 (1966). For a more detailed discussion of the literature, see infra Part I.B. For statements
as to the apparent rigor and strictness of the no-conflict rule, see ANDREW STAFFORD & STUART
RITCHIE, FIDUCIARY DUTIES: DIRECTORS AND EMPLOYEES 45–51 (2d ed. 2015).
5. See infra Part I.A.
6. See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE
OF CORPORATE LAW 15 (1991); Daniel Fischel & John H. Langbein, ERISA’s Fundamental
Contradiction: The Exclusive Benefit Rule, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1105, 1114–16 (1988); John
H. Langbein, Questioning the Trust-Law Duty of Loyalty: Sole Interest or Best Interest?, 114
YALE L.J. 929, 958–60 (2005). For a more detailed discussion of the literature, see infra Part
I.B.
7. See, e.g., John H. Farrar & Susan Watson, Self-Dealing, Fair Dealing and Related
Party Transactions—History, Policy and Reform, 11 J. CORP. L. STUD. 495, 495 (2011)
(comparing self-dealing law in several common law jurisdictions); Fischel & Langbein, supra
note 6 (examining trusts and corporate law); Zohar Goshen, The Efficiency of Controlling
Corporate Self-Dealing: Theory Meets Reality, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 393, 429–38 (2003)
(comparing self-dealing law for controlling shareholders in multiple jurisdictions); Melanie
B. Leslie, In Defense of the No Further Inquiry Rule: A Response to Professor John Langbein,
47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 541, 555–62 (2005) (examining trusts and corporate law).
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is not as important as scholars believe. Today, this is best seen by comparing
the United Kingdom—which continues to employ the traditional no-conflict
rule—to the United States, which adopted the fairness rule.
The key is to understand the structure of the rules and their usual operation.
First, in structure the rules are remarkably similar: they require strict loyalty
but provide exceptions or cleansing devices that protect transactions or
fiduciaries from liability.8 Each rule has multiple cleansing devices. Under
the U.K. no-conflict rule, companies may even craft their own exceptions, a
permissive approach that the U.S. fairness rule denies.9 Comparing the
substantive content of each rule, including their full range of exceptions,
reveals that neither rule is logically or necessarily stricter, more flexible, or
better calibrated to deter harmful self-dealing.10
To be sure, courts articulate the rules differently. The no-conflict rule bans
self-dealing transactions whether they are fair or not, while the fairness rule
saves them if they are fair. The no-conflict rule is usually formulated as a
loyalty rule, while the fairness rule is often formulated in terms of its
signature cleansing device—proof of fairness.11 One rule seems strict, the
other more flexible.
But this is an apples-to-oranges comparison.12 Both fiduciary rules require
strict loyalty, imposing liability for self-dealing, but provide multiple
exceptions. Evaluating each rule therefore requires a comparison of its full
range of exceptions, including under the no-conflict rule those exceptions
that companies have crafted themselves. Comparing the rules in this way
reveals that neither rule self-evidently dominates the other in its rigor,
pragmatism, or ability to differentiate between harmful and nonharmful
conflicts.13

8. In the self-dealing context, exceptions are rules or standards that exclude the operation
of a given loyalty rule by protecting a fiduciary or transaction from the remedial consequences
that would otherwise arise under that loyalty rule. See infra Part III.A. Exceptions specify
what must be done to protect an interested fiduciary or transaction from a given loyalty rule.
Exceptions are similar to altering rules, which “tell private parties the necessary and sufficient
conditions for contracting around a default.” See Ian Ayres, Menus Matter, 73 U. CHI. L. REV.
3, 6 (2006); see also Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An
Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 122–23 (1989) (conceiving of altering
rules as “contracting around” default rules); Brett H. McDonnell, Sticky Defaults and Altering
Rules in Corporate Law, 60 SMU L. REV. 383, 383 (2007) (defining altering rules as
“prescrib[ing] what a corporation must do to legally opt out of a given default rule”). This
Article conceives of exceptions broadly. They include noncontractual rules such as rules
protecting transactions or fiduciaries from liability if they get beneficiaries’ informed approval
for a transaction or prove a transaction’s fairness. See infra Part III. Exceptions also include
rules that parties craft themselves that have the effect of excluding the operation of the loyalty
rule. For further discussion of exceptions, see infra Part II.A.
9. See infra Part II.C.
10. See infra Part II.
11. See infra Parts I.A and I.B for doctrinal formulations of the rules.
12. As an example of such a comparison, see Fischel & Langbein, supra note 6, at 1115–
16. Under the fairness rule, in contrast to the no-conflict rule, “self-dealing is not prohibited.
Rather, [self-dealing] transactions are permitted, but subject to greater judicial scrutiny.” Id.
13. See infra Part II.
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The second step is to examine the fiduciary rules in operation, including
the exceptions that companies actually adopt and directors actually use. They
operate quite similarly. Under the no-conflict rule, companies commonly
crafted an exception requiring directors to get some form of approval from
their fellow directors for a self-dealing transaction.14 A similar exception
developed under the fairness rule. Under both regimes, we would expect
rational fiduciaries faced with a strict loyalty rule and multiple exceptions to
gravitate to the exception they find most attractive, bearing in mind the share
of any bargaining surplus that the exception produces and the cost of using
the exception.15 In fact, under both regimes, interested directors do so,
routinely using an exception that is remarkably similar: approval by neutral
or disinterested directors.16 In the United States, securities laws also strongly
encourage fiduciaries to use this exception.17 In operation, both regimes task
neutral directors with policing self-dealing, enabling nuanced, commercially
sensitive responses to self-dealing.
Of course, the U.S. regime does offer an exception (proof of fairness) that
the United Kingdom does not. But the availability of this cleansing device
is unlikely to influence directors’ conduct, even that of opportunistic
directors, so strict are its requirements. Other doctrinal differences between
the rules even suggest that the fairness rule operates more strictly than the
no-conflict rule.18
This Article’s analysis has implications for scholarly debates and
regulatory policy. First, it shifts the debate from the false choice between no
conflict and fairness, showing that policymakers and scholars alike ought to
focus instead on exceptions or cleansing devices—on their substantive
content and practical use. Second, in corporate comparative law debates,
accounting for the distinct functions and operations of loyalty rules and
exceptions exposes the incompleteness of claims about either rule’s
superiority on any important dimension. In corporate law, the U.K. noconflict rule often operates anything but strictly, and the U.S. fairness rule is
generally no more effective in distinguishing between beneficiary-benefiting
and beneficiary-harming self-dealing. Neither fiduciary rule is friendlier to
management or better attends to the needs of commerce. In their operations,
the rules closely mirror one another: they enlist neutral directors to patrol
self-dealing, a commercially sensitive response. If anything, the U.S. rule is
more severe.
Third, this analysis sheds light on historical narratives in U.S. corporate
law. According to a widely accepted narrative, until the late nineteenth
century, corporate fiduciaries were subject to the no-conflict rule,19 a rule
14. See infra Part II.C.
15. See infra notes 192–229 and accompanying text.
16. See infra Parts III.A–B.
17. See infra notes 221–31 and accompanying text.
18. See infra Part III.D.
19. See generally Marsh, supra note 4 (examining the evolution of U.S. self-dealing law).
Marsh’s view has attracted widespread support; for discussion of the extent of that support
(and criticism of Marsh’s account), see David Kershaw, The Path of Corporate Fiduciary
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believed to have been imported from the United Kingdom.20 But the strict
no-conflict rule evolved “from condemnation, to toleration, to
encouragement of conflict of interest.”21 In its current state, the no-conflict
rule has become the fairness rule. Traditionalists see in the fairness rule the
weakening of fiduciary law; they lament its apparent decline.22 Progressives
embrace the change, regarding this development as a model for other fields
of fiduciary law.23 But if the no-conflict and fairness rules operate similarly,
this common narrative is incomplete, if not mistaken. Either the early U.S.
no-conflict rule did not significantly weaken in the manner claimed as it
evolved into the fairness rule, or it did not closely mirror its U.K. counterpart,
or perhaps both. Although the analysis here does not resolve the historical
debate, it suggests that we ought to consider each rule’s full range of
exceptions and their practical operations. An initial examination suggests
that the early U.S. no-conflict rule was never as strict as is often claimed; it
included exceptions, a “weakness” present from the start. The big change in
U.S. law occurred when courts expressly acknowledged that disinterested
directors could approve self-dealing.24 In adopting this exception, U.S. law
came more closely to resemble the U.K. law in operation, which had already
achieved the same flexibility by enlisting neutral directors to monitor selfdealing. Far from rejecting a stricter U.K. law, as many believe, U.S. law
followed the United Kingdom’s lead.
Finally, the analysis invites us to reconsider comparisons between
corporate law’s fairness rule and the no-conflict rule in other fields. In trust
law, for example, parties may authorize or consent to conflict transactions,
excluding the strict requirement for loyalty.25 An analysis of the relative
rigor of these rules also requires us to examine the extent to which fiduciaries
avail themselves of these exceptions.
This Article proceeds in Part I by examining the two fiduciary regimes and
scholarly accounts comparing them. To better understand the effects of the
fairness rule, it focuses on Delaware law, as Delaware is the most common
U.S. state for incorporation.26 To evaluate the U.K. no-conflict rule, it
examines English law, the law generally chosen for international
comparison.27 Part II examines the structure of each fiduciary regime,
Law, 8 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 395, 439–40 (2012). See also infra Part I.B (surveying literature
that accepts this narrative).
20. As to the law’s U.K. origins, see infra note 53 and accompanying text.
21. Marsh, supra note 4, at 57.
22. See infra notes 58–62 and accompanying text.
23. For example, John Langbein regards the success of the fairness rule in U.S. corporate
law as “highly instructive for trust law.” Langbein, supra note 6, at 962.
24. See infra Part IV.C.
25. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170(1) cmt. t (AM. LAW INST. 1959) (terms
of trust may permit certain self-dealing by trustee); id. § 216(1) (informed beneficiary consent
may protect trustee from liability for breach of trust).
26. See, e.g., STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW 10 (3d ed. 2015).
27. See, e.g., Paul L. Davies, Related Party Transactions: U.K. Model (European Corp.
Gov. Inst., Working Paper No. 387/2018, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3126996 [https://perma.cc/Q4V7-BRQU]. In this comparative study,
Davies considers the law of England and Wales as representative of U.K. law. Id.
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distinguishing between its underlying loyalty rule and exceptions. Part III
examines the rules in operation, focusing on the exceptions that companies
craft and fiduciaries invoke. This Article examines the implications of this
analysis and its generalizability to other settings in Part IV.
I. JUDICIAL FORMULATIONS AND SCHOLARLY DEBATES
This Part considers how courts have articulated the no-conflict and fairness
rules and the scholarly literature that has comparatively examined the rules.
A. The No-Conflict and Fairness Rules
The no-conflict rule bans fiduciaries from occupying positions of
“conflict.”28 In corporate law, Lord Cranworth in Aberdeen Railway Co. v.
Blaikie Bros.29 provides its classic formulation: “[n]o one, having [fiduciary]
duties to discharge, shall be allowed to enter into engagements in which he
has, or can have, a personal interest conflicting, or which may possibly
conflict, with the interests of those whom he is bound to protect.”30 As a rule
of equity, the rule is formulated in general terms, and its precise contours
have been variously stated.31
Where it operates, the no-conflict rule admits no inquiry into the merits of
a self-dealing transaction.32 Directors cannot save a transaction by showing
that it is fair to the company. According to Lord Cranworth in Aberdeen,
“[s]o strictly is this principle adhered to that no question is allowed to be
raised as to the fairness or unfairness of a contract so entered into.”33 Even
if a transaction is “as good as” or “better” than any alternative transaction
available to the company, it is voidable under the rule.34 Because the rule
forbids transactions that benefit a director, whether or not they also benefit
the company, the rule effectively requires directors to act in the principal’s
sole interests and is therefore also known as the sole-interest rule.35
28. The no-conflict rule applied in England prior to 1844, when companies operated as
unincorporated joint-stock companies in which directors were trustees in whom companies’
property was vested. GOWER, supra note 3, at 471. In 1844, under the Joint Stock Companies
Act, companies were permitted to incorporate by registration. See Joint Stock Companies Act
1844, 7 & 8 Vict. c. 110 (Eng.). As directors later became a sui generis category of fiduciary,
the no-conflict rule continued applying to them. Courts drew analogies to the duties of
trustees. See, e.g., Re Forest of Dean Coal Mining Co. [1878] 10 Ch D 450 (Eng.). Some
courts also developed the no-conflict rule by analogy to agents’ duties. See, e.g., Aberdeen
Ry. Co. v. Blaikie Bros. (1854) 1 Macq. 461 (appeal taken from Scot.); see also Ferguson v.
Wilson [1866] 2 Ch App. 77 (Eng.).
29. (1854) 1 Macq. 461 (appeal taken from Scot.).
30. Id. at 471.
31. P. D. Finn observes that the rule “can be cast only in large and general terms” and that
“there is no generally accepted formulation.” P. D. FINN, FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS 199 (1977).
32. Aberdeen, 1 Macq. at 472 (“[N]o inquiry on that subject [the merits of the conflicted
transaction] is permitted.”).
33. Id. at 471; see also Bray v. Ford [1896] AC 44 (HL) at 51–52 (describing the duty as
“an inflexible rule of the Court of Equity”).
34. Aberdeen, 1 Macq. at 472.
35. See Langbein, supra note 6, at 931. The rule is also often referred to as the “no further
inquiry rule.” Id.
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In 2006, the U.K. Parliament embedded corporate fiduciary duties in
legislation, making statute the source of directors’ duties.36 In doing so, it
did not substantially alter directors’ fiduciary obligations relevant to selfdealing but instead reproduced the practical effect of the common law noconflict rule.37 Indeed, the statutory duties are “based on” rules and
principles under the common law.38 This Article focuses on the common law
position until codification, because it has featured in relevant scholarly
debates, but also briefly examines the (largely identical) statutory
requirements.39
The fairness rule applies in U.S. corporate law. In that field, the United
States is said to have adopted the U.K. common law no-conflict rule before
“rapidly diverg[ing]” from it.40 By the mid-twentieth century, U.S. corporate
law had evolved into the fairness rule, which protects self-dealing
transactions if they are fair to the corporation.41 Under one judicial
formulation, “[w]hen directors of a . . . corporation are on both sides of a
transaction, they are required to demonstrate their utmost good faith and the
most scrupulous inherent fairness of the bargain.”42 Under another
formulation, “[d]irectors . . . on both sides of a transaction have the burden
of establishing its entire fairness.”43 Melvin Eisenberg explains that a
director “must act or deal fairly.”44 Directors who carry this burden are
protected from liability for fiduciary breach.
Courts and scholars grapple with the meaning of fairness. It is a range
rather than a point.45 It roughly equates with what parties would negotiate in

36. See generally Companies Act 2006, c. 46 (Eng.).
37. See PALMER’S COMPANY LAW ¶ 8.3104 (Geoffrey Morse ed., 2017); see also infra
notes 269–79 and accompanying text. The no-conflict rule applies not only to self-dealing but
also to the appropriation of corporate opportunities and use of corporate property. See infra
notes 329–30 and accompanying text.
38. See Companies Act 2006, c. 46, § 170(3) (Eng.).
39. The common law position until codification is considered in Parts I, II, and III.A–D.
The contemporary statutory position that largely codifies directors’ duties is considered in Part
III.E.
40. See Kershaw, supra note 19, at 400 (“[U.K. and U.S.] laws rapidly diverged to provide
starkly different fiduciary standards for directors.”).
41. The starting point for analysis under U.S. law is often the business judgment rule, “a
presumption that in making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an
informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best
interests of the company.” Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984). Plaintiffs can
rebut the presumption by generally alleging self-dealing, which then subjects the challenged
transaction to review under the fairness rule. See generally id. For a more detailed explanation
of the business judgment rule and how shareholders may rebut it, see infra notes 121–23 and
accompanying text.
42. See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983). The fairness rule also
applies to corporate officers. This Article confines its analysis to directors to ensure
equivalence with U.K. law, under which the no-conflict rule may not apply to officers.
43. Valeant Pharm. Int’l v. Jerney, 921 A.2d 732, 732 (Del. Ch. 2007) (quoting
Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 710).
44. Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Divergence of Standards of Conduct and Standards of
Review in Corporate Law, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 437, 450 (1993).
45. Id.
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arm’s-length dealings.46 Requiring “entire fairness,” contemporary courts
look not only to fairness of price—an inquiry into the agreed financial
terms—but also to fairness of dealing. With respect to dealing, courts
examine “when the transaction was timed, how it was initiated, structured,
negotiated, disclosed to the directors, and how approvals of the directors and
the stockholders were obtained.”47 The question is whether the process
substitutes for arm’s-length bargaining.48 Though courts assess transactions
on both dimensions of fairness (price and dealing), they treat the test as a
singular assessment of entire fairness.49
B. Scholarly Divide
A voluminous literature assesses the relative merits of the no-conflict and
fairness rules. When scholars study the fairness rule, they study the rule
imposed on directors under contemporary U.S. corporate law, usually
Delaware law. Scholars compare the fairness rule to its counterpart in U.K.
corporate law, the no-conflict rule.50 Scholars also measure the fairness rule
against its direct predecessor—the early U.S. no-conflict rule.51 For other
scholars, the basis of comparison is the no-conflict rule in trust law.52
Scholars generally assert equivalence among the no-conflict rules in these
various areas—that the early U.S. corporate no-conflict rule “began with the

46. Gottlieb v. Heyden Chem. Corp., 90 A.2d 660, 663 (Del. Ch. 1952) (specifying that
fairness requires that “the bargain had in fact been at least as favorable to the corporation as
[directors] would have required if the deal had been made with strangers”).
47. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 711.
48. See Valeant, 921 A.2d at 736 (“The process pursued by the directors was deeply
flawed with self-interest and no way substituted for arm’s-length bargaining.”).
49. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 711 (“[T]he test for fairness is not a bifurcated one as
between fair dealing and fair price. All aspects of the issue must be examined as a whole since
the question is one of entire fairness.”).
50. See, e.g., Deborah A. DeMott, The Figure in the Landscape: A Comparative Sketch
of Directors’ Self-Interested Transactions, 62 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 243, 244 (1999);
Farrar & Watson, supra note 7, at 520–21; David W. Giattino, Curbing Rent-Seeking by
Activist Shareholders: The British Approach, 25 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 103, 130–31
(2011); Kershaw, supra note 19, at 400.
51. See, e.g., Marsh, supra note 4, at 40–41; see also Norwood P. Beveridge, Jr., The
Corporate Director’s Fiduciary Duty of Loyalty: Understanding the Self-Interested Director
Transaction, 41 DEPAUL L. REV. 655, 659 (1992); Julian Velasco, The Diminishing Duty of
Loyalty, 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1035, 1041–42 (2018).
52. See, e.g., Langbein, supra note 6, at 958–61; Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter,
Dangerous Liaisons: Corporate Law, Trust Law, and Interdoctrinal Legal Transplants, 96
NW. U. L. REV. 651, 651 (2002).
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same legal proposition about self-dealing” as U.K. law53 and was a
“straightforward borrowing” of trust law’s no-conflict rule.54
A basic assumption of this scholarship is that the no-conflict and fairness
rules operate differently, to different effect. For example, Harold Marsh, Jr.
famously defended the no-conflict rule, regarding its evolution toward
fairness as an “abject failure.”55 The fairness rule, Marsh asserted, did “little
or nothing to inhibit conflicts of interest.”56 Victor Brudney describes this
change as an undesirable weakening of fiduciary law.57 To Brudney, courts
“substantially eroded” fiduciary law during the twentieth century, allowing
corporate management “substantial discretion . . . to divert corporate assets
to its own benefit at investors’ expense.”58 Also citing Marsh, Lawrence
Cunningham says, “[t]he traditional strength of [fiduciary law] decayed
during the twentieth century.”59 Evan Criddle regards the evolution in
Delaware law toward fairness as an instance of courts “dismantl[ing]
traditional fiduciary rules and remedies.”60 To Amir Licht, the fairness rule
has had a “pernicious” effect “that necessarily leads to subpar compliance . . .
by design.”61
On this traditional view, the no-conflict rule is stricter toward self-dealing
than the fairness rule because the former bans transactions that the latter

53. Kershaw, supra note 19, at 395; see also Ahmed Bulbulia & Arthur R. Pinto, Statutory
Responses to Interested Directors’ Transactions: A Watering Down of Fiduciary Standards,
53 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 201, 202 (1977) (“Early American courts followed the traditional
English rule and held such [self-dealing] contracts or transactions to be voidable at the option
of the corporation.” (footnotes omitted)); Kershaw, supra note 19, at 400 (“Self-dealing law
in both the United Kingdom and the United States began by adopting the same fiduciary
principles from English trust law . . . and for a brief period they both looked to the same U.K.
case as the leading case.”).
54. ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 164 (1986) (referring to the early U.S. corporate
no-conflict rule as “a result of the court’s straightforward borrowing of an existing rule from
trust law”); see also Rock & Wachter, supra note 52, at 668 (describing the early U.S.
corporate no-conflict rule as “the pure trust law duty of loyalty”).
55. Marsh, supra note 4, at 54.
56. Id. at 73 (speaking of the then-contemporary rules governing self-dealing).
57. Brudney, supra note 4, at 1434.
58. Id. at 1410.
59. Lawrence A. Cunningham, Choosing Gatekeepers: The Financial Statement
Insurance Alternative to Auditor Liability, 52 UCLA L. REV. 413, 414 n.1 (2004); see also
Bulbulia & Pinto, supra note 53, at 203 (referring to the change of law as “[a] weakening of
the early inflexible rule”); Julian Velasco, A Defense of the Corporate Law Duty of Care, 40
J. CORP. L. 647, 688 (2015) (“The deterioration of the rigor of the duty of loyalty has continued
such that, by now, the duty of loyalty is only weakly enforced.”).
60. See Criddle, supra note 4, at 999, 1019.
61. Amir N. Licht, Farewell to Fairness: Towards Retiring Delaware’s Entire Fairness
Review 14 (European Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 439/2019, 2019),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3331097 [https://perma.cc/5ESE-NHHD]; see also id. at 57 (“The
substantive fairness review prong of Delaware’s entire fairness doctrine is perhaps the single
most prominent example for a core issue on which Delaware’s corporate law and U.K.
fiduciary (including company) law diverge. While seeming sensible when examined in
isolation, substantive fairness review is inconsistent with fundamental tenets of fiduciary
law . . . . [T]his contradiction and its deplorable consequences for companies and shareholders
have been pointed out by [Harold] Marsh.”).
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would permit.62 Its approach of prohibiting self-dealing outright also saves
adjudication costs associated with resolving complex questions about
fairness, which would be required under the fairness rule.63 The rationale is
that these cost savings more than offset losses from the rule’s overbreadth.64
There is also a moral footing to the rule: the unforgiving approach toward
disloyalty that is suggested by its common formulation aligns with judicial
rhetoric that emphasizes the distinctive character of fiduciary duties and the
high standard of conduct they require.65
Other scholars favor the fairness rule.66 While accepting Marsh’s claims
that the “strict” no-conflict rule succumbed to the “more flexible” fairness
rule,67 they prefer the fairness rule because it better distinguishes between
harmful and beneficial (or fair) conflicts than does the no-conflict rule.68 As
John Langbein explains, the no-conflict rule mistakenly treats all conflicts as
harmful, without allowing for the possibility that self-dealing may at times
be in the best interests of beneficiaries.69 What the rule really does in banning
conflicts without further inquiry “is to identify some conceivable but
conjectural evil and then conclusively presume that this farfetched plot
actually transpired, by refusing to let the putative evildoer prove that no such
thing happened.”70 The no-conflict rule therefore may deter future
fiduciaries from beneficiary-regarding conduct—it overdeters conflicts.71
From these progressive scholars’ perspectives, a better rule would allow
the fiduciary to prove that self-dealing benefited the beneficiary. They point
62. See Giattino, supra note 50, at 130–31 (“Delaware relies on fairness to review
conflicts of interests and loyalty . . . . This approach is more forgiving than the British
approach, which is an affirmative duty to avoid conflicts of interests.”); Leslie, supra note 7,
at 565 (asserting that the fairness rule “would allow a large number of self-dealing transactions
to pass undetected” and that adopting the fairness rule would “eliminate the few disincentives
to self-dealing that trustees do face”); see also Farrar & Watson, supra note 7, at 520–21 (a
fair transaction may fall short of the best transaction available); Leslie, supra note 7, at 565–
66 (describing the risk of fiduciary liability under the fairness rule as “remote”).
63. See generally Robert H. Sitkoff, Fiduciary Principles in Trust Law, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY LAW 41 (Evan J. Criddle et al. eds., 2019).
64. See Robert H. Sitkoff, Trust Law, Corporate Law, and Capital Market Efficiency, 28
J. CORP. L. 565, 573–74 (2003) (“[T]hese deals are so frequently undesirable that the costs of
extirpating the entire class of transactions (a rule) are less than the costs of case-by-case
adjudication (the fairness standard).”).
65. For the quintessence of such rhetoric by U.S. courts, see Meinhard v. Salmon, 164
N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928).
66. Scholars often refer to the fairness rule as a best-interest rule in opposition to the noconflict rule, which they regard as a sole-interest rule. See generally Langbein, supra note 6.
67. See, e.g., Rock & Wachter, supra note 52, at 670 (referring to the original no-conflict
rule, based on trust law, as “strict [and] uncompromising” and the fairness rule as “more
flexible”).
68. The position is described well by Langbein, supra note 6.
69. Id. at 951–52.
70. Id. at 953 (asserting this for self-dealing arising in auction sales).
71. Id. (“More important for present purposes, the [no-conflict] rule also overdeters. By
penalizing trustees in cases in which the interest of the trust beneficiary was unharmed or
advanced, the rule deters future trustees from similar, beneficiary-regarding conduct.”).
Langbein also acknowledges that a no-conflict rule might underdeter if not all instances of
wrongdoing are detected. Id. at 951.
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to the fairness rule as such a rule.72 According to Langbein, this rule
“recognize[s] that some conflicts benefit the corporation.”73 The evolution
from no conflict to fairness is “a successful experience” and “highly
instructive for trust law,” which still applies the no-conflict rule.74 Similarly,
Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel regard the fairness rule as an optimal
governance structure, reflecting realities of competitive business and
enabling corporations to maximize shareholder welfare.75 These progressive
scholars agree with the traditionalists on one point: these rules operate
differently, to different effect.
II. SUBSTANTIVE CONTENT: LOYALTY RULES AND EXCEPTIONS
As this Part shows, the rules—in their substantive requirements—share a
common structure. They require strict loyalty subject to exceptions or
cleansing devices. Neither rule is logically or necessarily stricter, more
flexible, or better calibrated to deter harmful self-dealing.
A. Defining Terms
In the self-dealing context, exceptions operate in reference to a loyalty
rule, a rule that requires fiduciaries to act loyally toward a beneficiary or
principal. Exceptions exclude the operation of a given loyalty rule by
protecting a fiduciary or transaction from the remedial consequences that
would otherwise arise under that loyalty rule.76 Exceptions can be thought
of as cleansing self-dealing or waiving a loyalty rule. They specify what
must be done to protect a person or transaction from liability. For example,
if a fiduciary obtains her principal’s informed consent to certain disloyal
conduct, she will avoid the liability that she would otherwise have faced by
reason of her disloyalty.77
Exceptions vary along multiple dimensions. They may be the product of
judge-made law, statute, or private ordering.78 Some exceptions operate only
with shareholder approval; one (proof of fairness) requires a judicial finding.
72. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 6, at 15 (treating directors’ fiduciary duties as
conforming to the terms that venturers would have negotiated were the costs of negotiating
“sufficiently low”); id. at 92 (preferring the fairness rule to the no-conflict rule because the
former rule distinguishes between “managerial practices that harm investors’ interests and
[those] practices that simultaneously benefit managers and investors”); Fischel & Langbein,
supra note 6, at 1114–16; Langbein, supra note 6, at 954.
73. Langbein, supra note 6, at 962 (“Corporate law, recognizing that some conflicts
benefit the corporation, has replaced prohibition with regulation.”).
74. Id.
75. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 6, at 4–15 (focusing on fiduciary rules); id.
at 103–05 (focusing on the fairness rule).
76. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
77. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.06(1) (AM. LAW INST. 2006) (“Conduct by
an agent that would otherwise constitute a breach of duty . . . does not constitute a breach of
duty if the principal consents to the conduct . . . .”).
78. As to private ordering, U.K. companies often prescribe exceptions in their charters.
See infra Part III.A. The legal doctrine that allows corporate constituencies to define
exceptions in corporate charters may be thought of as meta rules, or background rules,
governing the creation of exceptions, rather than as exceptions themselves.
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Distinguishing between loyalty rules and exceptions is essential for
comparing the no-conflict and fairness rules because the rules are commonly
articulated in ways that hinder comparison. Courts and scholars have
formulated the fairness rule in terms of its signature exception or cleansing
device, as a regime requiring fairness.79 This can obscure its loyalty rule.
Meanwhile, courts and scholars often formulate the no-conflict rule in terms
of its loyalty rule, as a regime banning self-dealing.80 This can obscure its
exceptions.
B. The Fairness Rule: In Search of Loyalty
Of course, courts do not refer to the loyalty rule or to its exceptions as such
when formulating the fairness rule. Rather, they often state the rule in terms
of its signature exception or cleansing device, in language suggesting that the
rule requires fairness by directors.81 But courts have occasionally also
articulated the rule to reveal its underlying loyalty requirement. For example,
in In re Cox Communications, Inc. Shareholders Litigation,82 then-Vice
Chancellor Leo. E. Strine, Jr. stated the rule this way: self-dealing
transactions are “presumed voidable absent a demonstration, by the
interested party, that the transaction is fair.”83 This formulation can be
disaggregated into its functional components, revealing a loyalty rule and an
exception.84 The loyalty rule invalidates self-dealing transactions, rendering
them voidable, or otherwise imposes liability. The exception requires proof
of fairness.
Fully stated, the fairness rule in fact provides multiple exceptions.
Identifying them as well as the loyalty rule usefully begins with an
examination of section 144(a) of the Delaware General Corporate Law,85 a
provision that states three conditions. Under section 144(a), no self-dealing
transaction, as defined, shall be “void or voidable” because of self-dealing if
any of these conditions are satisfied.86 Judicial and scholarly views diverge
on the effect of satisfying the conditions,87 and these competing views are
considered below.88 However, the most common interpretation treats the
79. See supra notes 42–44 and accompanying text.
80. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
81. See, e.g., supra notes 41–42 and accompanying text.
82. 879 A.2d 604 (Del. Ch. 2005).
83. Id. at 614.
84. Brett McDonnell lends support to this view under U.S. law. In self-dealing law, he
regards the default position as a “prohibition on conflict transactions” and treats the conditions
in section 144(a) as rules that “alter” that position. See McDonnell, supra note 8, at 414–16.
85. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a)(1) (2019).
86. Section 144 applies to certain defined self-dealing transactions, including those
between a corporation and one or more of its directors and those between the corporation and
a firm in which a director has a financial interest. Id. Self-dealing transactions beyond the
reach of section 144 may nevertheless benefit from exceptions or safe harbors provided by
common law. The provision also applies to officers. This Article examines directors’ liability
only to ease comparison with U.K. law, which regulates directors differently from officers.
87. See, e.g., Cumming v. Edens, No. 13007-VCS, 2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 54, at * 46 (Del.
Ch. Nov. 21, 2017) (“Our case law interpreting Section 144(a)(1) is murky at best.”).
88. See infra notes 263–67 and accompanying text.
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three conditions as alternative exceptions.89 Commentators and courts also
refer to them as “safe harbors.”90
To see why these conditions in section 144(a) are exceptions and to
identify the loyalty rule, it is useful to consider the consequences for a selfdealing transaction when none of the conditions are satisfied. To be sure,
section 144(a) does not specify the consequences, and it neither requires
loyalty nor imposes liability. Rather, the common law provides the
consequences of satisfying none of the conditions by imposing a loyalty
rule—the backdrop against which the statutory conditions function. Courts
do occasionally state the loyalty rule—as in Cox Communications.91 More
often, though, they allude to it when they explain the protection section
144(a) offers (when any of its conditions are satisfied). For example, in
Benihana of Tokyo, Inc. v. Benihana, Inc.,92 Vice Chancellor Donald F.
Parsons, Jr. explained, “[s]atisfying the requirements of [section] 144 only
means that the [challenged] [t]ransaction is not void or voidable solely
because of the conflict of interest.”93 In Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc.,94
the Delaware Supreme Court described section 144 as providing a “safe
harbor for corporate boards to prevent director conflicts of interest from
voiding corporate action.”95 In Cox Communications, Vice Chancellor
Strine described section 144 as “addressing only the common law principle
that interested transactions were entirely invalid and providing a road map
for transactional planners to avoid that fate.”96 These statements suggest a
strict common law loyalty rule that invalidates self-dealing transactions, a
rule equivalent to a requirement for directors either to avoid such transactions
or to act with undivided loyalty toward the corporation.97 The conditions in
89. See infra Table 1.
90. See, e.g, infra note 95 and accompanying text.
91. In re Cox Commc’ns, Inc. S’holders Litig., 879 A.2d 604, 614 (Del. Ch. 2005); see
supra note 82 and accompanying text.
92. 891 A.2d 150 (Del. Ch. 2005), aff’d, 906 A.2d 114 (Del. 2006).
93. Id. at 185. The court’s use of “solely” makes clear that the statute offers shelter for
invalidity arising from self-dealing but not from other grounds, such as illegality. See id. at
177 (“Because a majority of the disinterested and independent directors approved the BFC
Transaction, the interested nature of that transaction does not render it either void or voidable
solely for that reason, provided the material facts as to Abdo’s and any other director’s or
officer’s interest were disclosed or known to the Benihana Board.”); see also Fliegler v.
Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218, 222 (Del. 1976) (Section 144 “provides against invalidation of an
agreement ‘solely’ because such a director or officer is involved.”).
94. 634 A.2d 345 (Del. 1993).
95. Id. at 365.
96. Cox Commc’ns, 879 A.2d at 614–15; see also In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig.,
907 A.2d 693, 756 n.464 (Del. Ch. 2005) (“[W]here the evidence shows that a majority of the
independent directors were aware of the conflict and all material facts . . . but acted to reward
a colleague rather than for the benefit of the shareholders, the Court will find that the directors
failed to act in good faith and, thus, that the transaction is voidable.”); Nebenzahl v. Miller,
C.A. No. 13206, 1996 Del. Ch. LEXIS 113, at *11 (Del. Ch. Aug. 26, 1996) (“A plaintiff who
alleges and then ultimately proves a transaction to be unfair may deprive a director defendant
of Section 144’s statutory safe harbor and make the director’s action voidable . . . .”).
97. Case authorities do not formulate the U.S. loyalty rule consistently, leaving the precise
contours of self-dealing unsettled. Some authorities suggest that invalidation occurs for selfdealing when interested directors vote to authorize a self-dealing transaction for the company.
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section 144(a) operate as exceptions because they shelter self-dealing
transactions from this loyalty rule, excluding the loyalty rule’s operation.
The common law is sometimes said to have rendered self-dealing
transactions automatically voidable.98 However, at least by the time of
section 144’s adoption in 1967, Delaware courts applying the common law
considered multiple factors, including fairness, before invalidating selfdealing transactions99 and were therefore not automatically invalidating selfdealing transactions. Those factors are believed to have become the
conditions—or exceptions—expressed in section 144(a)100 that shield selfdealing transactions from invalidity under the loyalty rule.
On a narrow view, the provision protects a self-dealing transaction from
invalidation but not from “entire fairness” review.101 On this view, even if
section 144(a) protects a self-dealing transaction, the transaction may attract
liability for fiduciary breach. On a broad view, section 144(a) protects a selfdealing transaction not only from invalidation but also from distinct,
additional fairness review.102 Under this latter approach, satisfying section
144 may be thought to doubly protect self-dealing, from invalidation as well
as further fairness review. On either interpretation of its effect, section
See EDWARD P. WELCH ET AL., FOLK ON THE DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION LAW 296
(2011 ed.) (“The Delaware Supreme Court has emphasized, however, that it overstates the
common-law rule to conclude that relationship, alone, was the controlling factor in such
interested transactions.”); S. Samuel Arsht & Walter K. Stapleton, Delaware’s New General
Corporation Law: Substantive Changes, 23 BUS. LAW. 75, 81 (1967) (Section 144 “specifies
three situations in which the fact that an interested officer or director participated in
authorizing the transaction will not affect the transaction’s validity.”); see also Blake
Rohrbacher et al., Finding Safe Harbor: Clarifying the Limited Application of Section 144,
33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 719, 722–24 (2008) (collecting sources); Julian Velasco, How Many
Fiduciary Duties Are There in Corporate Law?, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 1231, 1242–43 (2010)
(examining what constitutes self-dealing under the fairness rule).
98. See infra note 301 and accompanying text; see also CLARK, supra note 54, at 169
(referring to “Section 144 as shielding self-dealing against charges of automatic voidability”).
99. See, e.g., Marciano v. Nakash, 535 A.2d 400, 404 (Del. 1987) (referring to factors
under the common law that prevented a transaction being rendered void or voidable); see also
Beard v. Elster, 160 A.2d 731, 737 (Del. 1960) (treating self-dealing transactions as invalid
unless directors “prove[d] that the bargain had in fact been at least as favorable to the
corporation as [directors] would have required if the deal had been made with strangers”);
Gottlieb v. Heyden Chem. Corp., 91 A.2d 57, 58 (Del. 1952).
100. See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 365 (Del. 1993) (“Enacted in
1967, Section 144(a) codified judicially acknowledged principles of corporate governance to
provide a limited safe harbor for corporate boards to prevent director conflicts of interest from
voiding corporate action.”); Marciano, 535 A.2d at 404 (describing the common law factors
that could shield a self-dealing transaction from invalidity as “now crystallized in the
ratification criteria of section 144(a)”). Nevertheless, some courts regard section 144 as
having ameliorated a “per se” voidability rule under the common law.
101. CLARK, supra note 54, at 169 (rejecting the proposition under Delaware law that a
section 144–approved transaction “is completely shielded from shareholder attack and that a
court is precluded by the statute from examining the fairness of the transaction and possibly
invalidating it”); Rohrbacher et al., supra note 97, at 719–22; see also Cox Commc’ns, 879
A.2d at 615 (“Mere compliance with § 144 did not necessarily suffice” to answer the
“somewhat different question of when an interested transaction might give rise to a claim for
breach of fiduciary duty.”).
102. See Rohrbacher et al., supra note 97, at 720.
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144(a) performs the limited role of shielding self-dealing transactions from
invalidation. It does not itself render them valid.103
Applying the loyalty rule, courts have indeed invalidated self-dealing
transactions that failed to gain protection from section 144(a). For example,
in Valeant Pharmaceuticals International v. Jerney,104 directors engaged in
self-dealing by awarding themselves large cash bonuses. With no exception
invoked, the transaction was “voidable as between the parties to the
transaction.”105 More recently, in Reddy v. MBKS Co.,106 the Delaware
Supreme Court invalidated transactions between companies because a
director “stood on both sides of [each of them].”107
Courts exercise broad discretion in awarding remedies for self-dealing.108
They may grant rescissory damages.109 That would occur, for example, if
rescission were impractical, such as when a company has affirmed a selfdealing contract or the parties cannot be restored to their original positions.110
Vice Chancellor Strine has described the remedies for self-dealing as the
disgorgement of profits or payment of “whatever damages are necessary to
make the corporation whole.”111 Recently, courts and commentators have
asserted that distinct legal bases exist for rescission and the award of damages
when self-dealing occurs.112 While such a remedial approach complicates
an assessment of how strictly the U.S. loyalty rule operates, the analysis
suggests that the rule is similar in stringency to the corresponding loyalty rule

103. For further discussion, see infra notes 263–67 and accompanying text.
104. 921 A.2d 732 (Del. Ch. 2007).
105. Id. at 752.
106. 945 A.2d 1080 (Del. 2008).
107. Id. at 1087 n.15. The court also observed that the director had failed to satisfy his
burden of showing that the transactions were fair. Id. The court gave other reasons that
independently invalidated the transactions. Id.
108. See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 542 A.2d 1182, 1187 (Del. 1988) (“[A] fraud
action asserting fair dealing and fair price claims affords an expansive remedy and is brought
against the alleged wrongdoers to provide whatever relief the facts of a particular case may
require.”); see also Int’l Telecharge, Inc., v. Bomarko, Inc., 766 A.2d 437, 440 (Del. 2000)
(“In determining damages, the powers of the Court of Chancery are very broad in fashioning
equitable and monetary relief under the entire fairness standard as may be appropriate,
including rescissory damages.”).
109. Oberly v. Kirby, 592 A.2d 445, 466 (Del. 1991) (“If a transaction is found to be unfair
to the corporation, the stockholders may then demand rescission of the transaction or, if that
is impractical, the payment of rescissory damages. If, however, the directors meet their burden
of proving entire fairness, the transaction is protected from stockholder challenge.” (internal
citation omitted)); Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 714 (Del. 1983) (“Under such
circumstances, the Chancellor’s powers are complete to fashion any form of equitable and
monetary relief as may be appropriate, including rescissory damages. Since it is apparent that
this long completed transaction is too involved to undo, and in view of the Chancellor’s
discretion, the award, if any, should be in the form of monetary damages based upon entire
fairness standards, i.e., fair dealing and fair price.”).
110. See, e.g., Kirby, 592 A.2d at 466.
111. Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Delaware Way: How We Do Corporate Law and Some of the
New Challenges We (and Europe) Face, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 673, 677 (2005).
112. See In re Cox Commc’ns, Inc. S’holders Litig., 879 A.2d 604, 614–15 (Del. Ch. 2005);
Rohrbacher, supra note 97, at 719–22; see also infra notes 263–68 and accompanying text.
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under U.K. law, discussed below. For comparative purposes, this is enough
to shift our attention to each jurisdiction’s exceptions.
As Table 1 shows, section 144(a) provides three exceptions. They are
alternatives.113 The most notable is proof of fairness.114 Stated in section
144(a)(3), proof of fairness gives the U.S. fiduciary regime its name, usually
overshadowing the related loyalty rule. But nothing requires fiduciaries to
prove the fairness of a challenged transaction—or to invoke any other
exception. The burden to prove fairness rests on interested directors: if they
fail to adduce evidence to carry their burden, a court has no license to do the
work for them by examining a transaction’s fairness to avoid the loyalty
rule’s remedial consequences.115 As courts emphasize, the fiduciary rule
does not invalidate self-dealing transactions if they are unfair; rather, it
invalidates them unless interested directors prove they are fair.116
Table 1: Structure of the Fairness Rule
Loyalty Rule
Exceptions

U.S. Fairness Rule
Requires undivided loyalty
1. Disclose self-dealing to board/committee of directors
and obtain disinterested approval (§ 144(a)(1))
2. Disclose self-dealing to shareholders and obtain their
approval (§ 144(a)(2))
3. Prove entire fairness (§ 144(a)(3) or common law)

Two other exceptions appear in section 144(a)(1) and (2). According to
these provisions, no self-dealing transaction is invalid solely because of selfdealing if the transaction is approved by, respectively, a majority of the
disinterested directors or a majority of the shareholders entitled to vote on

113. See infra Table 1.
114. Proof of fairness as an exception is also independently grounded in the common law.
See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 26, at 166 (“[Section] 144 is not the only means of validating
conflicted interest transactions under Delaware law. If the director proves the transaction was
fair to the corporation, no liability will result.”). Proof of fairness may operate more narrowly
under section 144(a)(3) than the common law because that provision requires that a transaction
be “authorized, approved or ratified.” DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a)(3) (2019).
115. See Velasco, supra note 97, at 1243 (“[Under the fairness rule], the shareholders do
not have to prove any actual wrongdoing, but only a cognizable conflict of interest, and then
the directors must prove that they have done nothing wrong.”). At the motion to dismiss stage,
a shareholder “must allege some facts that tend to show the transaction was not fair,” but the
pleading burden is low and satisfied with “some facts” implying lack of entire fairness. Stein
v. Blankfein, C.A. No. 2017-0354-SG, 2019 Del. Ch. LEXIS 199, at *19 (Del. Ch. May 31,
2019) (quoting Solomon v. Pathe Commc’ns Corp., C.A. No. 12563, 1995 Del. Ch. LEXIS
46, at *5 (Del. Ch. Apr. 21, 1995)). A determination that the entire fairness standard applies
“normally will preclude dismissal of a complaint on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.”
Orman v. Cullman, 794 A.2d 5, 20 n.36 (Del. Ch. 2002).
116. Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1376 (Del. 1993); see also Strine, supra note 111,
at 677 (“In the absence of such proof [of fairness], the fiduciary interested in the
transaction . . . must disgorge any profits or pay whatever damages are necessary to make the
corporation whole.”).

956

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 88

the matter.117 These exceptions require good faith and informed decisions
by each of these constituencies.
Illustrating the complexity of the U.S. regime, the exceptions provided by
section 144(a)(1) and (2) operate somewhat differently from proof of
fairness. First, they require approval from directors or shareholders,
respectively. Second, they offer, conceptually at least, somewhat weaker
protection than proof of fairness.118 Again, there is some dispute on this
question,119 although a common interpretation of these provisions holds that
each provides business judgment protection to directors’ self-dealing.120 A
product of the business judgment rule (BJR), business judgment protection
offers a powerful shield against the loyalty rule. It requires courts to presume
that, “in making a business decision, the directors of a corporation acted on
an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken
was in the best interest of the company.”121 Plaintiffs may rebut the BJR if
they allege sufficient facts with particularity establishing, or if the record
otherwise demonstrates, that the directors’ decision was not made in
accordance with the BJR’s presumptions.122 Though evidence of self-

117. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a)(1)–(2) (2019). Courts have understood section
144(a)(2) to require approval by disinterested shareholders. See Fliegler v. Lawrence, 361
A.2d 218, 221–22 (Del. 1976).
118. For other interpretations of the protection these exceptions provide, see infra notes
263–67 and accompanying text.
119. See infra notes 263–67 and accompanying text.
120. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 366 n.34 (Del. 1993) (“[A]pproval of
an interested transaction by either a fully-informed disinterested board of directors, 8 Del.C.
§ 144(a)(1), or the disinterested shareholders, 8 Del.C. § 144(a)(2), provides business
judgment protection.”); Oberly v. Kirby, 592 A.2d 445, 467 (Del. 1991) (“Under 8 Del.C.
§ 144, a transaction will be sheltered from shareholder challenge if approved by either a
committee of independent directors, the shareholders, or the courts.”); Marciano v. Nakash,
535 A.2d 400, 405 n.3 (Del. 1987) (“[A]pproval by fully-informed disinterested directors
under section 144(a)(1), or disinterested stockholders under section 144(a)(2), permits
invocation of the business judgment rule and limits judicial review to issues of gift or waste
with the burden of proof upon the party attacking the transaction.”); Toedtman v. Turnpoint
Med. Devices, Inc., No. N17C-08-210-RRC, 2019 Del. Super. LEXIS 46, at *24 (Del. Super.
Ct. Jan. 23, 2019) (“Upon approval by disinterested directors under § 144(a)(1), or approval
by disinterested shareholders under § 144(a)(2), the Court will review the interested
transaction under the business judgment rule.”); see also BAINBRIDGE, supra note 26, at 162–
65 (concluding that approval under section 144(a)(1) or (2) provides business judgment
protection); Strine, supra note 111, at 678 (“Delaware tries to respect the business judgment
of disinterested directors and stockholders. How? By invoking the protection of the business
judgment rule if an interested transaction is approved by a majority of the independent
directors or by a majority of the disinterested stockholders, after full disclosure.”).
Importantly, an alternative interpretation of section 144(a)(1) gives it more limited effect. As
to this interpretation, see infra notes 263–67 and accompanying text. The analysis proceeds
under the broader interpretation of section 144(a)(1) since that is perhaps the prevailing
interpretation and is more likely to support common claims that treat the no-conflict rule as
stricter. Under a narrower interpretation of the fairness regime’s exceptions, the opposite may
be closer to the truth.
121. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
122. Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1279 (Del. 1988) (“[W]hen
a court reviews a board action, challenged as a breach of duty, it should decline to evaluate
the wisdom and merits of a business decision unless sufficient facts are alleged with
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dealing generally can rebut the BJR,123 section 144(a) thwarts this possibility
by cleansing the self-dealing, shielding it from the loyalty rule. Nevertheless,
in theory, on grounds other than self-dealing, challenging shareholders could
rebut the BJR, but it is hard to imagine plausible scenarios when this would
occur. Authorities suggest that the BJR would not protect a transaction that
amounted to “waste,” but waste rarely arises.124 Accordingly, under a
common view of the statute, the approval of either disinterested directors or
shareholders under section 144(a)(1) or (2), respectively, affords business
judgment protection, a strong shield that plaintiffs are unlikely to
overcome.125
Finally, if interested directors have de jure or de facto voting control,
courts interpret the exceptions differently.126 The exceptions under section
144(a)(1) and (2) have more limited effect in these circumstances, protecting
directors and transactions from liability unless challenging shareholders
prove that the self-dealing transaction was unfair.127 That is, they are only
partial or limited exceptions in a setting where interested directors have
heightened voting power.
In sum, the fairness regime requires undivided loyalty from corporate
directors but provides exceptions. Proof of fairness protects interested
directors and self-dealing transactions from liability. Under a common
interpretation, two other exceptions—approval by majorities of either
particularity, or the record otherwise demonstrates, that the decision was not the product of an
informed, disinterested, and independent board.”).
123. See Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156 (Del. 1995); HMG/Courtland
Props., Inc. v. Gray, 749 A.2d 94, 114 (Del. Ch. 1999) (“[P]roof of such undisclosed selfdealing [involving undisclosed, buy-side interest in a transaction] in itself, is sufficient to rebut
the presumption of the business judgment rule and invoke entire fairness review.”); see also
WELCH ET AL., supra note 97, at 297 (asserting that, “[a]mong other things, the presumption
may be rebutted by a showing that a majority of the directors were ‘interested’”).
124. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 263 n.63 (Del. 2000) (referring to “waste” as
constituting “an exchange of corporate assets for consideration so disproportionately small as
to lie beyond the range at which any reasonable person might be willing to trade”). Waste has
been regarded as “an extreme test, very rarely satisfied by a shareholder plaintiff.” Zupnick v.
Goizueta, 698 A.2d 384, 387 (Del. Ch. 1997).
125. See Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp. (In re Unitrin, Inc. S’holders Litig.), 651 A.2d
1361, 1371 n.7 (Del. 1995) (“Because the effect of the proper invocation of the business
judgment rule is so powerful and the standard of entire fairness so exacting, the determination
of the appropriate standard of judicial review frequently is determinative of the outcome of
[the] litigation.”); see also Stephen M. Bainbridge et al., The Convergence of Good Faith and
Oversight, 55 UCLA L. REV. 559, 602 (2008) (“Under DGCL section 144(a), approval by a
majority of fully informed and disinterested directors effectively immunizes a related-party
transaction from meaningful judicial review.”); Claire Hill & Brett McDonnell, Sanitizing
Interested Transactions, 36 DEL. J. CORP. L. 903, 913 (2011) (“This burden [under the BJR]
is extremely hard for plaintiffs to overcome; they rarely succeed in cases decided under the
business judgment rule.”).
126. See, e.g., Cooke v. Oolie, No. Civ. A. 11134, 2000 WL 710199, at *13 n.41 (Del. Ch.
May 24, 2000).
127. Id. Vice Chancellor William B. Chandler III gave business judgment protection to
transactions approved under section 144(a). Since the interested directors “neither maintained
voting control [of the company] . . . nor dominated or controlled the disinterested directors,
the business judgment rule constitutes the appropriate standard of review for the [self-dealing]
transaction” under section 144. Id.
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disinterested directors or shareholders—confer business judgment protection
on self-dealing transactions. These two exceptions operate less generously
to interested directors that have voting control.
C. The No-Conflict Rule: In Search of Exceptions
English courts formulate the no-conflict rule as a strict loyalty rule that
renders self-dealing transactions voidable.128 Recall from Aberdeen Railway
Co. v. Blaikie Bros.129 that the no-conflict rule is “[s]o strictly . . . adhered
to, that no question is allowed to be raised as to the fairness or unfairness of
a contract so entered into.”130
However, this loyalty rule is subject to exceptions, as shown in Table 2.131
First, self-dealing transactions are protected by the approval of a majority of
shareholders.132 Second, such transactions may be protected by provisions
in corporate charters.133
Table 2: Structure of the No-Conflict Rule
Loyalty Rule
Exceptions

U.K. No-Conflict Rule134
Requires undivided loyalty
1. Disclose self-dealing to shareholders and obtain
their approval
2. Satisfy conditions, if any, specified in charter

128. Recognizing that the rule invalidated self-dealing transactions, one court described the
rule as expressing a “disability” on the part of directors rather than a “duty” to refrain from
certain conduct. See Movitex Ltd. v. Bulfield [1988] BCLC 104 (Ch D) (Eng.). The analysis
here focuses on the common law no-conflict rule; it examines the recently adopted (and
equivalent) statutory regime in Part III.E.
129. Aberdeen Ry. Co. v. Blaikie Bros. (1854) 1 Macq. 461 (appeal taken from Scot.).
130. Id. at 471.
131. In the United Kingdom, neither courts nor scholars generally use the terms
“exception,” “cleansing device,” or “safe harbor” in describing the no-conflict rule. However,
they clearly recognize the existence of rules that exclude the operation of a given loyalty rule,
that is, of rules that operate as exceptions. For a discussion of exceptions, without using that
term, see Joshua Getzler, Ascribing and Limiting Fiduciary Obligations: Understanding the
Operation of Consent, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW 39, 52–62
(Andrew S. Gold & Paul B. Miller eds., 2014).
132. Strictly speaking, such approval prevents breach of the rule, relieving directors of the
consequences that would otherwise arise. See Movitex Ltd. v. Bulfield [1988] BCLC 104 (Ch
D) 118 (Eng.) (arguing that informed approval by shareholders “protects the director not
because it operates to release him or absolve him from the consequences of a breach of the
self-dealing rule but because, to the extent that the company in general meeting gives its
informed consent to the transaction there is no breach, the conflict of duty and interest is
avoided”).
133. Meta, or background, rules permit the creation of these exceptions. See supra note 78
and accompanying text.
134. Table 2 reflects the self-dealing regime under the common law until codification as
well as the contemporary self-dealing regime under the Companies Act 2006. As to the
Companies Act 2006, see infra Part III.E.
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The former exception operates to exclude the operation of the loyalty rule
if shareholders approve a self-dealing transaction, either before or after it
occurs. Such approval requires directors to fully disclose their conflicts to
shareholders and face the uncertainty of shareholders’ responses. In applying
this exception, courts distinguish between directors’ conduct qua directors
and their conduct qua shareholders. Directors’ fiduciary responsibilities arise
in the former capacity only, freeing them to vote in shareholder meetings as
their self-interest dictates. The remarkable result under the common law is
that directors can approve their own self-dealing, that is, vote as shareholders
to absolve themselves of liability as directors for self-dealing.135 Directors’
freedom here is limited if their conduct amounts to misappropriation of
corporate property or dishonesty, but this protective doctrine generally fails
to prevent directors with de jure or de facto control from voting their shares
to approve their own self-dealing.136
The second category of exception is key. It reflects the capacity under the
no-conflict rule of corporate charters to vary fiduciary duties.137 U.K.
companies in their charters may specify what must be done to protect an
interested fiduciary or transaction from liability. Charter terms may thus
135. See, e.g., North-West Transp. Co. v. Beatty (1887) 12 App. Cas. 589 (PC) (appeal
taken from Can.); Baird v. J. Baird & Co. (Falkirk) Ltd. (1949) SLT 368 (Scot.).
136. PAUL L. DAVIES, GOWER’S PRINCIPLES OF MODERN COMPANY LAW 656–57 (6th ed.
1997). Under the contemporary statutory position, votes cast by interested directors to
retrospectively approve (or ratify), but not to prospectively approve (or authorize), their own
conduct are disregarded, a change from the common law position. See infra Part III.E.
137. The ability of companies to contract around the duty of loyalty, through terms in their
corporate charters, was recognized in Liquidators of the Imperial Mercantile Credit Ass’n v.
Coleman [1873] 6 LRE & I App. 189 (HL) (Eng.). Under the common law, corporate charters
cannot exclude liability for fraudulent fiduciary breaches. See In re City Equitable Fire Ins.
Co. [1925] Ch 407 (Eng.). Otherwise, the power is broad: a charter term “could, if worded
sufficiently widely, relieve [directors] of any obligation not to place themselves in a position
where their personal interests could conflict with their duty.” L. C. B. GOWER ET AL., THE
PRINCIPLES OF MODERN COMPANY LAW 601 (4th ed. 1979). Not all agree that fiduciary duties
should be excludable by contract. See, e.g., Amir N. Licht, Motivation, Information,
Negotiation: Why Fiduciary Accountability Cannot Be Negotiable, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK
ON FIDUCIARY LAW 159, 173–79 (D. Gordon Smith & Andrew S. Gold eds., 2018). This ability
to contract around fiduciary duties existed despite a provision in the Companies Act that
purported to prevent charter terms from waiving the loyalty rule. Courts read down that
provision or overlooked its existence when giving effect to charter terms that excluded the
operation of the loyalty rule. For example, section 310 of the Companies Act 1985 rendered
void any charter term that exempted an officer from, or indemnified him against, any
“liability” that would otherwise attach to him for “any negligence, default, breach of duty or
breach of trust.” Companies Act 1985, c. 6, § 310 (Eng.). Courts gave broad effect to
exceptions in charters, typically with no consideration of this provision. One court resolved
the uncertainty created by section 310 by interpreting the no-conflict rule as “an over-riding
principle” or a “disabilit[y]” under which directors operated, rather than as a “duty” to refrain
within the terms of section 310. See Movitex Ltd. v. Bulfield [1988] BCLC 104 (Ch D) 120
(Eng.). In Gwembe Valley Development Co. v. Koshy [2003] EWCA (Civ) 1048 [108] (Eng.),
the Court of Appeal rejected the distinction between disabilities and duties in Movitex as “an
unnecessary complication” without offering an alternative explanation for the narrow effect
given to section 310. Uncertainty remained as to how section 310 and equivalent provisions
in earlier corporations legislation could be reconciled with the judicial practice of allowing
charter terms to conditionally exclude the loyalty rule. As to the position under the Companies
Act 2006, see infra note 275.
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conditionally exclude the loyalty rule, creating exceptions not otherwise
available to the parties. The effect of allowing the parties to craft their own
exception is that the exception may be broader than those available under
judge-made law or statute. This latitude sets the United Kingdom apart from
the Delaware position. Delaware law allows companies to adopt charter
terms to eliminate or limit directors’ liability for fiduciary breach, provided
they do not do so for breaches of the duty of loyalty.138 Under Delaware law,
the duty of loyalty is mandatory,139 which is understood to prevent parties
from crafting their own exceptions to limit liability for breach of the duty of
loyalty.140
D. Initial Comparisons
The no-conflict and fairness regimes are similarly structured. Both rules
impose liability for self-dealing transactions, effectively requiring undivided
loyalty from directors. The no-conflict regime may appear to impose such a
loyalty requirement, since courts formulate it that way.141 But the fairness
rule imposes much the same underlying requirement. Though often
formulated in terms of one of its exceptions, it also prohibits self-dealing
unless an exception operates—a prohibition as “categorical” as that under the
no-conflict regime.142
Some might point to remedial differences to suggest that the liability rules
in fact differ between these two regimes. Focusing on the remedial
consequences of these loyalty rules unexpectedly complicates matters.
Under the no-conflict regime, self-dealing transactions are voidable. Though
it is often suggested that fiduciaries must also account for their profits,
leading treatises suggest that the canonical rule is that rescission is the only
remedy and “if rescission is no longer possible . . . then the court will not
intervene.”143 While not free from doubt, this point about the no-conflict rule
138. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2017).
139. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Optimal Defaults for Corporate
Law Evolution, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 489, 496 n.16 (2002) (The duty of loyalty is “regulated in
a mandatory fashion.”); McDonnell, supra note 8, at 414 (“[Corporations] may not opt out in
advance from the prohibition as applied to any and all conflicts—this is the sense in which the
duty of loyalty is a mandatory rule.”); see also Jens C. Dammann, Indeterminacy in Corporate
Law: A Theoretical and Comparative Analysis, 49 STAN. J. INT’L L. 54, 64 (2013) (“[T]here
is widespread agreement that the parties cannot eliminate the corporate duty of loyalty.”).
140. Interestingly, scholars suggest that charter provisions may add additional safeguards
for self-dealing transactions, that is, that they may require fiduciaries to do more than that
specified in the exceptions in section 144. See, e.g., Dammann, supra note 139, at 64.
Companies may opt out of the corporate opportunities rule under recently adopted legislative
reform. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 122(7) (2017). (But this freedom does not extend to selfdealing.).
141. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
142. See supra Part II.A.
143. PALMER’S COMPANY LAW, supra note 37, ¶ 8.3114 (“On orthodox principles,
rescission is the only remedy (unless the director has also infringed some other rule that will
deliver an alternative).”); id. ¶ 8.3319 (“Orthodox rules suggest that an account of profits is
not available where the impugned transaction is with the company; then the remedy is simply
rescission at the election of the company.”); id. ¶ 8.3320 (“If the company is party to a
transaction which is in breach of the director’s fiduciary duty, then the transaction is prima
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undermines claims that its remedies are more stringent than those under the
fairness rule.
Under the fairness regime, courts may also strike down self-dealing
transactions. For example, in Valeant Pharmaceuticals International v.
Jerney, the Delaware Court of Chancery rescinded a self-dealing transaction
where an interested director had failed to prove fairness or establish another
exception.144 The director had “no right to retain” the value he received
under the transaction and was “requir[ed] to disgorge the full amount.”145
When rescission is impossible, U.S. law provides other remedies. In
Oberly v. Kirby,146 the Delaware Supreme Court observed that shareholders
“may . . . demand rescission” of self-dealing transactions and “if that is
impractical, [demand] the payment of rescissory damages.”147 Authorities
emphasize courts’ discretion in granting monetary remedies, including
rescissory damages, even when rescission is impossible, such as when the
parties cannot be restored to their original position.148
To be sure, U.S. courts have allowed fairness-based damages for selfdealing, raising the possibility that the U.S. loyalty rule is not properly
characterized as strict. However, scholars making this claim about the award
of fairness-based damages tend to cite merger transactions that implicate selfdealing by controlling shareholders, rather than directors.149 These are deals
that cannot be unwound and that justify different treatment of self-dealing
because courts “have long worried about a controller’s potential ability to
take retributive action against outside directors if they did not support the
controller’s chosen transaction.”150 Nevertheless, even in controllingfacie voidable at the election of the company . . . . [T]he company cannot generally both
affirm the contract and also claim an accounting of the profits made by the director in breach
of his fiduciary duty.”); Len Sealy, The Statutory Statement of Directors’ Duties: The Devil
Is in the Detail, CO. L. NEWSL. (Sweet & Maxwell, London), 2008, at 1, 3 (stating that the only
remedy for self-dealing “is avoidance of the contract (and if that right has been lost . . . there
is none)”); see also PAUL L. DAVIES & SARAH WORTHINGTON, GOWER: PRINCIPLES OF
MODERN COMPANY LAW 522 (10th ed. 2016) (“On orthodox principles avoidance (i.e.,
rescission) is the only remedy, . . . [a]nd if rescission is no longer possible for any reason, then
the court will decline to intervene.” (citations omitted)).
144. See generally 921 A.2d 732 (Del. Ch. 2007).
145. Id. at 752; see also supra note 111 and accompanying text.
146. 592 A.2d 445 (Del. 1991).
147. Id. at 466; see supra note 107 and accompanying text.
148. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 714 (Del. 1983) (“Under such circumstances,
the Chancellor’s powers are complete to fashion any form of equitable and monetary relief as
may be appropriate, including rescissory damages. Since it is apparent that this long
completed transaction is too involved to undo, and in view of the Chancellor’s discretion, the
award, if any, should be in the form of monetary damages based upon entire fairness standards,
i.e., fair dealing and fair price.).
149. See, e.g., Criddle, supra note 4, at 1020 n.137 (citing two cases involving mergers by
controlling shareholders in support of the proposition that courts award fairness-based
damages for breaches of the fairness rule).
150. In re EZCORP Inc. Consulting Agreement Derivative Litig., No. 9962, 2016 WL
301245, at *86 (Del. Ch. Jan. 25, 2016). In light of these concerns, courts impose heightened
requirements to cleanse self-dealing. See, e.g., Kahn v. M & F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635
(Del. 2014) (examining the cleansing effect of certain procedural safeguards in controlling
shareholder transactions).
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shareholder mergers, courts applying the fairness rule have broad discretion
to fashion relief, including by awarding rescissory damages.151
Both U.S. and U.K. fiduciary regimes impose similar loyalty rules. These
rules require undivided loyalty, imposing similar remedial consequences.152
Under both regimes, self-dealing transactions may be voidable.153 An
account of profits is allowed under the fairness rule and arguably also under
the no-conflict rule. The U.S. regime may permit a wider range of remedies.
Still, each regime provides a roughly equivalent backdrop to the operation of
exceptions.
By acknowledging their similar loyalty rules, we see that the regimes’
major differences, at least in their textual formulations, lie in their exceptions.
Under both regimes, shareholder approval protects a self-dealing transaction.
The United States also provides exceptions based on proof of fairness and
the approval of disinterested directors, while the United Kingdom allows
companies to craft exceptions in their corporate charters.154 Without
analyzing how U.K. companies use their capacity to craft exceptions and then
examining how interested directors under each regime use or invoke
exceptions, one cannot tell which rule, or whether either rule, is stricter, more
pragmatic, or better calibrated to deter self-dealing. At this stage, therefore,
without considering the rules’ operations, neither is self-evidently superior
on any important dimension, contrary to often-expressed views.
III. RULES IN OPERATION
How does each rule tend to operate? This Part first examines the charter
provisions U.K. companies adopt in order to identify the full range of
exceptions available to interested directors. It then examines under each
regime the incentives these exceptions create for interested directors and
which, if any, they tend to invoke.
A. Range of Exceptions
Recall that the U.K. common law allows companies to craft their own
exceptions.155 As early as 1873, companies adopted exceptions in their
charters protecting interested directors and transactions from liability under
the loyalty rule in circumstances specified in the relevant provisions.156
Under these provisions, interested directors simply had to disclose their selfdealing to disinterested directors. In Liquidators of the Imperial Mercantile
Credit Ass’n v. Coleman,157 the House of Lords examined the effectiveness
151. See, e.g., In re Dole Food Co. Stockholder Litig., Consolidated C.A. No. 8703-VCL,
2015 WL 5052214, at *56 (Del. Ch. Aug. 27, 2015) (citing Bomarko, Inc. v. Int’l Telecharge,
Inc., 794 A.2d 1161, 1177 (Del. Ch. 1999), aff’d, 766 A.2d 437, 440 (Del. 2000)).
152. See supra Tables 1–2.
153. Compare Aberdeen Ry. Co. v. Blaikie Bros. (1854) 1 Macq. 461 (appeal taken from
Scot.), with In re Cox Commc’ns, Inc. S’holders Litig., 879 A.2d 604, 614 (Del. Ch. 2005).
154. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
155. See supra Part II.
156. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
157. [1873] 6 LRE & I App. 189 (HL) (Eng.).
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of such a provision. A director had entered into a financial transaction with
the company under which it would “place” the securities of another entity;
the company earned a 1.5 percent commission for doing so, while the
director, through his own stockbroking partnership, received a 3.5 percent
commission on the transaction.158 The court assumed that a charter term
could shelter the interested director from liability for self-dealing if the
conditions in the charter term were satisfied,159 and it therefore focused on
whether the director had disclosed the nature, and not simply the existence,
of his interest in the transaction to fellow directors, as required by the charter
term. Since he had not, the provision failed to shelter him from liability under
the no-conflict rule,160 although the reasoning is clear that it would have done
so had he satisfied the provision.
Companies seem to have generally adopted this form of exception. In an
1877 book of corporate law forms and precedents, Sir Francis Palmer
provided an example of such a charter provision, observing that its adoption
“has now become very common.”161 Using a random sample of companies
formed in 1892, Timothy Guinnane and his coauthors found that over 90
percent conditionally excluded the loyalty rule through charter terms.162
They found similar percentages for companies formed in 1912 and 1927, the
other years they investigated.163 They observed, “[i]n most (though not all)
cases, the [charters] specified that directors had to disclose any conflict of
interest to the board and refrain from voting on matters in which they were
interested.”164 It seems that the great majority of companies adopted such

158. Id. at 200.
159. Lord Cairns assumed, without deciding, that the charter term “impliedly sanctioned
the retaining of his interest by a director if he declared it.” Id. at 205.
160. For another early example, see Transvaal Lands Co. v. New Belg. (Transvaal) Land
& Dev. Co. [1914] 2 Ch 488 (Eng.).
161. FRANCIS BEAUFORT PALMER, CONVEYANCING AND OTHER FORMS AND PRECEDENTS
RELATING TO COMPANIES INCORPORATED UNDER THE COMPANIES ACT 1862 AND 1867, at 271
(London, Stevens & Sons 1877) (“But a company may unquestionably waive the benefit of
the [no-conflict] rule . . . . [A]nd it has now become very common to do so, and to insert
clauses to the effect of the above.” (citations omitted)). Palmer gave the following precedent:
“The company may make contracts with any of the directors upon such terms as the directors
shall think fit; and a director shall not . . . be accountable for any profit made by him in respect
of any such contract . . . provided that the fact of his being so interested therein, and the nature
of his interest be fully and fairly disclosed . . . .” Id. at 270–71. I am indebted to Paul Davies
for drawing my attention to this source. See Davies, supra note 27, at n.24.
162. See Timothy W. Guinnane et al., Contractual Freedom and Corporate Governance in
Britain in the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries, 91 BUS. HIST. REV. 227, 269
(2017). The authors randomly drew two samples in which 90.5 percent and 95.9 percent of
companies formed in 1892 (or soon before) “allowed directors to contract with the company.”
Id. at 246. The study examines whether companies adopted a provision from the U.K. model
articles of association that expressed the loyalty rule or crafted their own provision, effectively
rejecting the model provision. See generally id. The percentages reflect those companies that
crafted their own provisions that altered the loyalty rule.
163. Id. at 268 tbl.9 (showing that 96 percent and 90 percent of sampled companies formed
in 1912 and 1927, respectively, altered the loyalty rule).
164. Id. at 246. The reference to voting is ambiguous but appears to apply to voting by
directors as directors rather than as shareholders.
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exceptions in their charters when they were formed.165 This was true for
companies large and small, public and private, and apparently without
distinction based on the self-dealing risk they posed.166
By 1928, such charter exceptions were in such frequent use that Parliament
intervened. It required directors to disclose their interest in any self-dealing
transaction to their fellow directors and imposed a fine for failing to
disclose.167 Rather than restricting companies’ capacities to adopt charter
exceptions, the statute imposed a mandatory disclosure obligation on
interested directors.168 The statute thus independently mandated what
charter exceptions themselves required as a condition for exempting the
loyalty rule, prescribing a minimum standard of conduct by interested
directors.169 Importantly, the statutory duty had no effect on the operation of
the no-conflict rule170: it coexisted with the no-conflict rule. The statutory
duty was reenacted in the Companies Act 1929 and similarly reenacted in
substantially the same form in successive iterations of the Act.171 With the
disclosure of self-dealing thereby mandated, companies crafted their charter
exceptions around this requirement. Charters were written to provide
protection if directors complied with the statutory duty, requiring much as
they had before Parliament’s intervention.172
Through the mid- to late twentieth century, companies continued widely
adopting such charter terms that conditionally excluded the loyalty rule. In
the 1950s, a prominent scholar, L. C. B. Gower, observed that these charter
exceptions were “common form in the articles of registered companies.”173
With certain exceptions, and “provided that the directors act bona fide and
remember to disclose their personal interests,” Gower asserted that “there is,
today, little effective restraint on [directors’] power to enter into contracts
with the company.”174 Writing two decades later, Gower observed that the
no-conflict rule “should not weigh too heavily upon [directors], especially as
it is likely to be waived in the company’s articles in so far as it relates to

165. Id. at 229 (reporting on the decisions of “incorporators” to adopt particular charter
terms).
166. Id. at 239–40, 246–57. Public companies were significantly less likely than private
companies to adopt charter terms to escape the loyalty rule, but around 86 percent of public
companies still did so. Id. at 254.
167. See Companies Act 1928, 18 & 19 Geo. 5 c. 45, § 81 (Eng.). It initially applied to
self-dealing “contracts” and later to self-dealing “transaction[s and] arrangement[s].” See
Companies Act 1980, c. 22, § 60 (Eng.).
168. Companies Act 1928, 18 & 19 Geo. 5 c. 45, § 88 (Eng.).
169. Id.
170. The statute provided that “[n]othing in this section shall be taken to prejudice the
operation of any rule of law restricting directors of a company from having any interest in
contracts with the company.” See Companies Act 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, § 199(5) (Eng.);
see also Companies Act 1985, c. 6, § 317(9) (Eng.).
171. The provision was substantially reenacted as section 149 of the Companies Act 1929,
as section 199 of the Companies Act 1948, and as section 317 of the Companies Act 1985.
As to Companies Act 2006, see infra Part III.E.
172. See, e.g., Hely-Hutchinson v. Brayhead Ltd. [1968] 1 QB 549 (Eng.).
173. GOWER, supra note 3, at 481.
174. Id. at 484–85.
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contracts with the company.”175 By 1985, table A of the Companies Act
included a charter term along similar lines—exempting the loyalty rule if
interested directors disclosed their interests in a self-dealing transaction to
their fellow directors.176 Table A set out model articles of association that
applied by default to companies that had not registered their own articles or
whose articles failed to address a particular matter.177 Reporting in 1999, the
English and Scottish law commissions observed that corporate charters
“frequently” included such charter terms.178 The law commissions cited a
“commonly” adopted charter term—similar to that in table A—under which,
subject to informing disinterested directors of one’s self-dealing, “a Director
may contract with and participate in the profits of any contract or
arrangement with the Company.”179 In 2006, Parliament amended the
Companies Act to make changes that were thought to mirror the practical
effect of the common law, taking account of the widespread use of these
charter terms.180
In sum, since at least the late nineteenth century, U.K. companies adopted
charter exceptions that excluded the operation of the loyalty rule if interested
directors informed their fellow directors of the nature of their self-dealing. If
interested directors provided the requisite disclosure, the exception excluded
the operation of the loyalty rule, protecting the transaction from invalidation
under the loyalty rule. If interested directors did not, the company could
invalidate the transaction under the loyalty rule. Separately, as shown in
Table 2, interested directors could protect the transaction from invalidation
by getting the informed approval of shareholders on an ad hoc basis.
Reflecting these market practices, Table 3 shows the full range of
exceptions commonly available to interested directors under the fairness and
no-conflict regimes.181 Of course, only the fairness regime provides an
exception based on proof of fairness. Otherwise, the fiduciary regimes are
175. GOWER ET AL., supra note 137, at 613.
176. See The Companies (Tables A to F) Regulations 1985, SI 1985/805, art. 85 (“Subject
to the provisions of the Act, and provided that he has disclosed to the directors the nature and
extent of any material interest of his, a director notwithstanding his office—(a) may be a party
to, or otherwise interested in, any transaction or arrangement with the company or in which
the company is otherwise interested; (b) may be a director or other officer of, or employed by,
or a party to any transaction or arrangement with, or otherwise interested in, any body
corporate promoted by the company or in which the company is otherwise interested; and (c)
shall not [account for any profit from such office or employment] and no such transaction or
arrangement shall be liable to be avoided . . . .”).
177. Id.
178. LAW COMM’N & SCOTTISH LAW COMM’N, COMPANY DIRECTORS: REGULATING
CONFLICTS OF INTERESTS AND FORMULATING A STATEMENT OF DUTIES 77 (1998), https://
www.scotlawcom.gov.uk/files/1112/7892/5856/dp105_reg_conflicts.pdf [https://perma.cc/
TJN8-K7H2] (“Under the general law a director cannot . . . receive any benefit without the
informed consent of shareholders. This informed consent is frequently given in the articles of
association, but contingent on disclosure [by directors of their interest to their fellow
directors].”).
179. Id.
180. The statute includes an express exception along the lines of the exception commonly
adopted in corporate charters. See infra Part III.C.
181. See infra Table 3.
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broadly similar, but with some noteworthy differences. Both regimes
provide an exception based on the informed approval of shareholders,
although the U.K. exception is more lenient. That exception is interpreted to
allow interested directors to vote their shares qua shareholders to approve
self-dealing, even if their votes are determinative;182 U.S. law instead
requires approval by disinterested shareholders.183 Moreover, U.S. law
imposes heightened requirements for interested directors with significant
voting power184 (as for controlling shareholders generally), while U.K. law
does not regard controlling shareholders as fiduciaries, does not forbid
controlling shareholders from voting to approve their self-dealing, and relies
instead on statutory provisions to regulate controlling shareholder
transactions—provisions that “do[] not . . . deal effectively with [self-dealing
transactions] with controlling shareholders.”185
Table 3: Structure of No-Conflict and Fairness Rules in Operation
Loyalty Rule

Exceptions

U.S. Fairness Rule
Requires undivided loyalty
1. Disclose self-dealing to
board/committee of
directors and obtain
disinterested approval
2. Disclose self-dealing to
shareholders and obtain
their approval
3. Prove entire fairness

U.K. No-Conflict Rule
Requires undivided loyalty
1. Disclose self-dealing to
fellow directors
2. Disclose self-dealing to
shareholders and obtain
their approval

Under both fiduciary regimes, neutral director approval protects a selfdealing transaction from the loyalty rule. Under the fairness rule, this
exception requires the informed approval of disinterested directors.186 Under
the no-conflict rule, this exception, the product of the corporate charter,
requires disclosure (to fellow directors) by interested directors of their
interests in a transaction.187 Informed of their colleagues’ conflicts and
cognizant of their own fiduciary duties, fellow directors under the no-conflict
rule must in effect give a weak form of approval of self-dealing.188 Thus, the

182. This was the position under the common law whether interested directors sought ex
ante shareholder approval or ex post shareholder ratification. The contemporary statutory
regime forbids directors from voting to approve a transaction (but not from voting to ratify a
transaction), tightening the common law position somewhat. See supra notes 135–36 and
accompanying text.
183. See supra note 117.
184. See supra notes 126–27 and accompanying text.
185. See Davies, supra note 27, at n.64.
186. See supra Table 3.
187. See supra Table 3.
188. Enriques et al., supra note 2, at 153 (Rules requiring or encouraging board approval
of self-dealing have stronger “prophylactic potential” than rules requiring that a board be

2019]

REASSESSING SELF-DEALING

967

two regimes protect self-dealing under similar conditions: under the fairness
rule, if fellow directors approve a transaction; and under the no-conflict rule,
if disinterested directors are informed of it by interested directors. To the
extent a difference exists, the no-conflict rule is again probably more lenient
because of the weaker form of neutral director approval it involves.
It is worth briefly considering whether the fact that shareholders under the
no-conflict rule need to approve these charter exceptions means that they, the
exceptions, maximize value for shareholders. Shareholders approve these
exceptions either implicitly when they subscribe for shares in a company with
such a provision or explicitly when they hold shares in a company without
such a provision that later adopts one.189 Given shareholders’ approval, one
could argue that these provisions are value-maximizing since shareholders
would not otherwise have agreed to them. But that view is contestable190
because we cannot be sure that shareholders only approve value-maximizing
charter provisions. In any case, this Article’s inquiry is comparative. What
matters here is that a broadly similar exception based on neutral director
approval exists under both fiduciary regimes. The fact that one requires
shareholder approval simply underscores the point that a comparison of the
rules’ substantive content shows that neither rule is self-evidently superior in
any respect (given the impossibility of knowing what rules shareholders
would approve and how robustly they would review them). The inquiry here
considers their practical operation at the point in time that a self-dealing
transaction occurs.
In sum, the no-conflict regime has long offered dual exceptions—ad hoc
shareholder approval and disclosure to fellow directors. Although the
common law permits companies to adopt other, perhaps more lenient,
exceptions in their charters,191 there is no evidence that companies
informed of self-dealing, with the latter “amount[ing] to implicitly subjecting them to a weak
form of board authorization or ratification.”).
189. Midstream charter amendments required the approval of 75 percent of voting
shareholders. Companies Act 2006, c. 46, §§ 21, 283 (Eng.); Companies Act 1985, c. 6, §§ 9,
378 (Eng.). Whenever shareholders gave approval, they did so in advance of any self-dealing
and without information about any particular instance of self-dealing; they gave generalized
advance approval.
190. The question of the efficiency of charter terms attracts vigorous debate. Compare
Lucian A. Bebchuk, Foreword: The Debate on Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law, 89
COLUM. L. REV. 1395 (1989), with Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate
Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1416 (1989). That debate centers on the process by which
companies adopt charter terms, whether they do so at the outset, in the initial charter, or later,
in “midstream” charter amendments. See Bebchuk, supra, at 1399–1408 (explaining the need
to determine the stage at which charter terms are adopted). At the initial charter stage, when
U.K. companies seem to have adopted the relevant terms (conditionally excluding the loyalty
rule), the question turns on whether companies’ stock prices reflected or incorporated the
content of these charter terms and thereby assured the terms’ efficiency; that question in turn
focuses attention on the existence of externalities, information asymmetries and cognitive
biases, and the role of actors like underwriters in pricing securities. See id. at 1405–08;
Brudney, supra note 4, at 1418 n.35; John C. Coffee, Jr., The Mandatory/Enabling Balance in
Corporate Law: An Essay on the Judicial Role, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1618, 1677 (1989); Melvin
A. Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1461, 1516–17 (1989).
191. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
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commonly adopt them. The fairness rule provides broadly similar
exceptions, with the addition of proof of fairness.
B. Use of Exceptions
In examining how interested directors use these exceptions, that is, which
ones (if any) they invoke, one would ideally want systematic empirical
evidence. Studying litigation about alleged self-dealing would be helpful,
and yet one could not know the extent to which practices revealed in litigation
were representative of wider deal practices.192 To examine how the fiduciary
regimes in fact operate, therefore, this analysis considers the incentives the
regimes create and the directorial behaviors one would expect in response. It
then considers other sources of data on how directors respond.
We can expect self-dealing fiduciaries to gravitate toward those exceptions
that benefit them most. These fiduciaries select the exception that they
expect to give them the greatest share of any bargaining surplus arising from
a self-dealing transaction, bearing in mind the expected cost of using that
exception.193 The bargaining surplus represents the difference between the
value of a self-dealing transaction to shareholders and to the interested
directors. For example, assume that two directors propose to buy an asset
from the company that they value more highly than do the company’s
shareholders. Say the directors value it at $10, while shareholders value it at
$6, giving a surplus of $4.194 The interested directors would use the
exception that would allow them the greatest share of that surplus, also taking
into account the expense of invoking the exception.
Consider the U.S. fairness regime first. In a two-way comparison of
shareholder approval and proof of fairness, which exception would interested
directors prefer? Zohar Goshen asks this question in a controlling
shareholder setting and suggests that proof of fairness would give interested
directors a greater share of any surplus than would shareholder approval.195
Under the latter rule, shareholders might refuse to approve the transaction,
holding out until they received a significant share of the surplus.196 Realizing
this, interested directors would prefer to prove the fairness of their transaction
by offering a price that is just fair enough to carry their burden of proof in
order to protect it from the loyalty rule.
192. See Geeyoung Min, The SEC and the Courts’ Cooperative Policing of Related Party
Transactions, 3 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 663, 697 (2014) (explaining why breach of duty of
loyalty cases are unlikely to provide reliable data on self-dealing transactions).
193. Another way to think of this claim is that interested directors will choose the exception
under which the underlying loyalty rule is least “sticky,” to use Brett McDonnell’s term. See
generally McDonnell, supra note 8. The harder an underlying rule to alter, the stickier it is.
194. See Goshen, supra note 7, at 411–12 (giving a similar example).
195. Id. Goshen examined these rules in the controlling shareholder setting. Although he
does not refer to the rules as exceptions, he examines which rule would give controlling
shareholders a larger share of the surplus. The analysis assumes that neither exception—
shareholder approval or proof of fairness—will be satisfied unless the transaction benefits the
company.
196. Id. at 412 (“The liability-rule approach gives an advantage to the majority, while the
property-rule approach gives the minority more bargaining power.”).
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The directorial self-dealing setting is less straightforward than that
simplified analysis suggests. Interested directors may choose among a
greater range of exceptions because they have the added alternative of
disinterested director approval. Moreover, in theory at least, the selection of
one exception does not necessarily rule out the use of another; interested
directors might employ exceptions sequentially, first attempting shareholder
approval and, if that fails, relying on proof of fairness.197 And the
institutional setting for shareholders makes it difficult to predict how
shareholders will respond when asked to approve a self-dealing transaction.
On the one hand, institutional investors hold increasing proportions of the
stock of public companies,198 increasing their capacity to vigorously
represent the interests of those for whom they invest. On the other hand,
passive institutional investors such as index funds have incentives to
underinvest in monitoring and to defer excessively to corporate management,
casting doubt on the vigor with which they represent their beneficiaries’
interests.199 Of course, proxy advisors and other mechanisms help
coordinate the activities of institutional investors, but there is still
considerable doubt about the rigor with which shareholders monitor
directorial self-dealing.
In a more realistic three-way setting, obtaining shareholder approval will
often prove more attractive to interested directors than proving fairness.
Interested directors have greater incentives to seek approval from
shareholders that are large in number and widely dispersed than from smaller
numbers of large shareholders, as the latter tend to be better organized and
more engaged.200 But even large institutional investors face collective action
problems and may lack the incentives and capacity to negotiate robustly with
interested directors and so may accept terms not because they are the best
that could be obtained but because they are better than any presently existing
alternative.201 Randall Thomas and his coauthors provide data showing that
197. While this is true, Delaware courts express reluctance to second-guess the decisions
of neutral decision-making bodies, meaning that they may refuse to treat a self-dealing
transaction as entirely fair if either disinterested directors or shareholders have disapproved
the transaction. See infra note 253 and accompanying text.
198. As to the increased holdings of institutional investors, see Lucian Bebchuk & Scott
Hirst, The Specter of the Giant Three, 99 B.U. L. REV. 721, 725–30 (2019) and Andrew F.
Tuch, Proxy Advisor Influence in a Comparative Light, 99 B.U. L. REV. 1459, 1508–09
(2019).
199. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, Index Funds and the Future of Corporate
Governance: Theory, Evidence, and Policy (European Corp. Governance Inst., Working
Paper No. 433/2018, 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3282794 [https://perma.cc/R5BLFXR6]. For other contributions examining implications of the rise of index funds, see Dorothy
S. Lund, The Case Against Passive Shareholder Voting, 43 J. CORP. L. 493 (2018) and Edward
Rock & Marcel Kahan, Index Funds and Corporate Governance: Let Shareholders Be
Shareholders (NYU Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 18-39, 2019),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3295098 [https://perma.cc/F6GU-LQED].
200. See Deborah A. DeMott, The Figure in the Landscape: A Comparative Sketch of
Directors’ Self-Interested Transactions, 62 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 243, 255 (1999)
(discussing how shareholding patterns may influence self-dealing).
201. The conduct of shareholders in mergers is instructive. See In re El Paso Corp. S’holder
Litig., 41 A.3d 432, 450–51 (Del. Ch. 2012) (referring to the risk of shareholders accepting

970

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 88

in the merger context shareholders rarely vote against transactions and
explain this finding as shareholders either blindly supporting deals or simply
preferring the deal proposed over no deal at all.202 Thomas and his coauthors
also demonstrate that the role of merger arbitrageurs—investors with shortterm investment horizons that become shareholders after mergers are
announced—exacerbates concerns about the rigor with which shareholders
review merger transactions, underscoring concerns about the agency costs of
institutional investing.203 A primary concern is the practice of companies
bundling merger approvals with approvals of potential director misconduct
in those transactions, a practice that can distort shareholders’ decisions.204
Important though these concerns are for mergers, they are less warranted for
routine self-dealing transactions, the transactions to which the doctrinal
analysis above applies.205 Such deals typically occur outside the merger
context. They involve transactions between the company and an individual
director, or an entity associated with an individual director, rather than the
entire board.206 Still, these concerns illustrate institutional investors’
suboptimal incentives when voting, giving us reason to question the rigor
they apply in approving directorial self-dealing.
Weighed against these considerations is that entire fairness is tough to
establish. As described below, the doctrine strongly discourages self-dealing
by rational and opportunistic directors alike.207 Relying on proof of fairness
subjects interested directors to the risk of error—the risk that interested
directors will mistakenly offer more than fair value or that judges will
mistakenly find the value offered is not fair.208 Proving fairness can be
expensive: if interested directors fail, they “are likely to end up paying for
the litigation out of their own pockets.”209 In line with these considerations,
Langbein asserts that interested directors would seek shareholder approval,
rather than try to prove fairness, because it “will almost always be more
“deals that, while ‘good’ . . . are not ‘as good’ as they could have been” in the merger context);
id. at 450 (suggesting that shareholders display “reluctance to ever turn down a premiumgenerating deal when that is presented”).
202. Randall S. Thomas et al., Understanding the (Ir)Relevance of Shareholder Votes on
M&A Deals 8–9 (Vanderbilt Law Research Paper Series, No. 19-06, 2019),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3333241 [https://perma.cc/9BCU-6BCL].
203. Id. at 46–65.
204. Id.
205. See supra Part III.B.
206. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 26, at 157 (“Self-dealing transactions rarely implicate the
entire board. To the contrary, they often involve misconduct by a single director.”).
207. See infra Parts III.C–D; see also Thomas et al., supra note 202, at 66 (“The breadth
of . . . [the] fairness inquiry when coupled with the conflicted party having the burden of proof
is daunting, and all the more so if there is also fear this inquiry may be plagued by hindsight
bias.”).
208. Another complicating factor is the presence of a third exception—disinterested
director review. Knowing that interested directors could seek to invoke this rule might reduce
shareholders’ incentives to hold out for a better deal from interested directors. Shareholders
might be less likely to drive a hard bargain with interested directors than if the only alternative
exception were proof of fairness.
209. This is because “loyalty violations are usually excluded from directors’
indemnification.” Min, supra note 192, at 696.
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attractive than a retrospective determination in which liability will attach if
the court disagrees with the [fiduciary’s] view.”210
Goshen and Langbein both raise good points. Their differing positions
reflect the difficulty in the abstract of determining which of these two
exceptions—proof of fairness or shareholder approval—interested directors
would be more likely to use. In companies with a widely dispersed and
fragmented shareholder base, shareholder approval would seem more
appealing, especially given courts’ hard line on fairness review. Still, neither
exception is particularly appealing to interested directors.
It is, however, clear which exception interested directors would find most
appealing to satisfy under the fairness regime: disinterested directors’
approval. To be sure, disinterested directors may be better positioned to
bargain than shareholders in general meeting because they face weaker
collective action problems.211 Disinterested directors may also have better
access to information about proposed self-dealing than shareholders, who
depend on managers for information.212 Nevertheless, commentators have
long expressed concern about the capacity and willingness of directors to
monitor and discipline self-dealing or other misconduct by their fellow
directors.213 The Supreme Court of Delaware has questioned whether the
requirement for independence of directors will “sufficient[ly] safeguard
against abuse, perhaps subconscious abuse.”214 In deciding whether to
approve self-dealing, disinterested directors may be influenced by feelings of
subtle ties including collegiality or an expectation that interested directors
will reciprocate if they, the disinterested directors, seek future self-dealing
opportunities.215 In fact, “many courts and commentators have voiced

210. Langbein, supra note 6, at 985.
211. See Thomas et al., supra note 202, at 65–69.
212. Id.
213. See, e.g., CLARK, supra note 54, at 183 (“[Director approval of self-dealing] fails
because, under conventional (although perhaps alterable) arrangements, the independent
directors may not really be independent, or may not have adequate resources and incentives
for doing a good job of review.”); id. at 184 (“[T]he director approval procedure for basic selfdealing suffers . . . from the time, information, and budget constraints on directors; and from
the fact that the cost of getting them into the position of being truly competent to pass judgment
on the business wisdom of a self-dealing transaction presented by insiders is considerable but
often unproductive for the corporation.”); J. Robert Brown, Jr., Disloyalty Without Limits:
“Independent” Directors and the Elimination of the Duty of Loyalty, 95 KY. L.J. 53, 101, 105
(2006) (arguing that boards exercise weak control over self-dealing transactions).
214. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 787 (Del. 1981); see also id. (When
directors “pass judgment” on their colleagues, “[t]he question naturally arises whether a ‘there
but for the grace of God go I’ empathy might not play a role.”).
215. John Armour & Jeffrey N. Gordon, Systemic Harms and Shareholder Value, 6 J.
LEGAL ANALYSIS 35, 66 (2014) (“[Directors] face more genteel pressures of camaraderie and
community between themselves and officers, which may have a subtly corrosive effect on
their ability to monitor and exert oversight.”); see also LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY
WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 31–34
(2004) (discussing social and psychological factors leading directors to favor senior
managers); James D. Cox & Harry L. Munsinger, Bias in the Boardroom: Psychological
Foundations and Legal Implications of Corporate Cohesion, 48 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83,
85–108 (1985) (arguing that psychological mechanisms generate powerful biases on the part
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skepticism over the capacity of board members to be totally objective when
called upon to pass judgment on transactions involving their peers.”216 As
Paul Davies and Sarah Worthington explain,
It is not difficult to envisage a board culture in which the steps taken [in
response to news of a fellow director’s self-dealing] are minimal, especially
if all the directors from time to time make such disclosures and trust that
their disclosure will be readily accepted if they readily accept disclosures
by others.217

Compared with the alternatives of shareholder approval and proving fairness,
disinterested director approval is timely and inexpensive for self-dealing
directors, who need not wait for a shareholder meeting to gain approval or
make their case publicly in such a meeting or before a court. Decisions made
by shareholders and courts, for or against interested directors, occur in the
public domain, subjecting interested directors to public scrutiny and potential
embarrassment whereas disapproval by disinterested directors will rarely get
disclosed unless the self-dealing transaction occurs anyway.218 That
disinterested directors can bargain with their fellow directors until approval
is given, whereas shareholders make their decisions on an up or down basis
without the same scope for bargaining, weighs in favor of interested directors
seeking the approval of their colleagues rather than shareholders. These
various considerations suggest that disinterested director approval would
allow interested directors to capture a greater share of any surplus than under
other exceptions219 and that interested directors would therefore prefer to
invoke that exception over seeking shareholder approval or proving
fairness.220

of independent directors, impairing their ability to “perceive and represent corporate interests”
(in assessing shareholder litigation)).
216. Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., Approval by Disinterested Directors, 20 J. CORP. L. 215, 216
(1995).
217. DAVIES & WORTHINGTON, supra note 143, at 519.
218. See infra notes 221–23 and accompanying text.
219. Disinterested directors have other incentives. This Article argues that they are subject
to distinct forces that make them more likely to approve a given self-dealing transaction than
disinterested shareholders or courts.
220. Enriques et al., supra note 2, at 154 (“Although U.S. jurisdictions stop short of
mandating board approval of managerial self-dealing, they strongly encourage it. . . . State
law creates incentives for interested managers to seek board approval by according
transactions that are authorized (or ratified) by the board business judgement rule
protection.”). In the context of corporate fiduciaries, Amir Licht argues that, presented with
the option of business judgment review under Kahn v. M & F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635
(Del. 2014), deal planners prefer to simultaneously use independent director approval and
majority-of-the-minority shareholder approval in order to gain such protection rather than face
entire fairness review. See Licht, supra note 61, at 44–45. This view is consistent with the
analysis above, suggesting that deal planners prefer procedural exceptions or cleansing
devices to proving fairness. Professor Licht interprets the dual procedural protections as a
“strict, novel yet classic mechanism of fully-informed consent.” Id. at 44. However, Licht
regards fairness review as “pernicious,” id. at 14, as “a doctrine that effectively benefits
corporate insiders,” id. at 23, an interpretation that is in tension with deal planners’ preference
for using the dual procedural protections over proof of fairness.
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U.S. federal securities laws reinforce self-dealing directors’ incentives to
seek cleansing from disinterested directors rather than to use other
exceptions. Under Item 404(a) of Regulation S-K, the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) requires companies to disclose transactions
valued above $120,000 in which a director or officer “had or will have a
direct or indirect material interest.”221 Although corporations enjoy
discretion to decide whether a director or officer’s interest is “material,” and
therefore requires disclosure,222 the provision broadly captures self-dealing
transactions, subject to certain de minimis exceptions.223 Importantly, Item
404(b) of Regulation S-K requires companies to describe their policies for
reviewing, adopting, or ratifying any transaction disclosed under Item 404(a).
Overwhelmingly, Delaware-incorporated public companies adopt policies
requiring interested directors to disclose self-dealing transactions to
corporate boards or committees of directors and tasking those boards or
committees with determining whether to approve those transactions. A
review of the disclosures in response to Item 404 by one hundred Delawareincorporated public companies, randomly selected, is illustrative.224 Of these
companies, ninety-three required the board or a board committee, typically
the audit committee, to review all self-dealing transactions above certain
dollar thresholds, usually $120,000, and to approve those transactions or
not.225 Although section 144(a)(1) does not prevent interested directors from
attending, participating in, or voting at a meeting to approve a self-dealing
transaction in order to have cleansing effect (rather, it requires approval by a
majority of the disinterested directors), forty-eight companies in the sample
did impose such a restriction on interested directors, virtually assuring that
any board or committee approval would be by disinterested directors.226
Other companies in the sample might have imposed similar restrictions, but
this could not be verified because many such companies simply described
their related party policy, as required by Regulation S-K, without disclosing
221. 17 C.F.R. § 229.404(a) (2019). This disclosure requirement extends beyond directors
and officers to “related persons” generally. This Article focuses on directors only.
222. See Min, supra note 192, at 717 (identifying the materiality standard in Item 404(a)
as suffering from “definitional uncertainty” and as an area for “potential abuse of discretion”).
223. Certain transactions are deemed not to give rise to an indirect material interest,
including transactions involving a counterparty (and the relevant public company) in which
the related party has a limited financial interest in the counterparty or in which the related
party’s only interest in the counterparty is as a director. 17 C.F.R. § 229.404(a) (2019)
(Instruction 6 to Item 404(a)).
224. In July 2018, using the S&P Capital IQ database, companies were identified using the
following screening criteria: (1) Market Capitalization; (2) Exchanges (all listings); and (3)
State of Incorporation: Delaware. From the resulting data, entities (typically trusts) listed on
the NYSE Arca and on Pink Sheets LLC were excluded. The remaining entities were listed
on either the New York Stock Exchange or Nasdaq Global Capital Market. The search
identified 2623 entities. A sample of one hundred companies was randomly selected and their
most SEC filings, typically their Form 14A proxy statements, were reviewed. Where possible,
their underlying related party and related policies, often available on companies’ websites,
were also reviewed. See infra Appendix A.
225. The policies often exempted certain “pre-approved” transactions not considered to
create material conflicts.
226. See Appendix A for further findings.
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the policy itself. In any case, even without such a restriction ensuring that
any board or committee approval would be by disinterested directors, the
near-universal requirement for interested directors to seek board or
committee approval of their self-dealing transactions will usually assure that
disinterested directors consider whether to approve these transactions if, as
some claim, these transactions typically involve a single interested
director.227 These results are consistent with other empirical evidence.228
Appendix A summarizes the companies’ related party policies and Appendix
B lists the companies in the sample.
For example, Bank of America Corporation’s related party policy
encompasses self-dealing transactions as defined by Item 404. It provides
that “our Corporate Governance Committee must approve or ratify any
related person transactions,” and when doing so, consider various factors,
including the interested directors’ interests and the availability of arm’slength bids or market terms.229 The company’s corporate governance
guidelines forbid committee members from participating in deliberations or
voting when they are interested in a transaction under consideration.230
The related party policies under Item 404 generally required interested
directors to seek advance director approval for their material self-dealing
transactions. We cannot know whether the approval obtained would satisfy
section 144(a)(1) or assure business judgment protection for the transaction,
since the review process is opaque, leaving open questions as to whether
approval was in good faith and fully informed, as required by the Delaware
statute. Nevertheless, the evidence suggests that a significant proportion of
companies would have assured that any approval be by disinterested
directors, assuming compliance with their related party policies. Given the
requirements of these policies and the approval infrastructure readily
available, directors likely have strong incentives to invoke the exception
requiring disinterested director approval when they seek to engage in selfdealing.
227. See, e.g., BAINBRIDGE, supra note 26, at 157 (“Self-dealing transactions rarely
implicate the entire board. To the contrary, they often involve misconduct by a single
director.”). This claim is consistent with a general review of related party transactions
disclosed by the sample companies.
228. Geeyoung Min studied 2012 data for Fortune 500 companies, finding that “most [selfdealing] transactions get approval from an approving committee consisting of ‘disinterested’
directors, thereby satisfying the first of the three conditions under DGCL Section 144.” Min,
supra note 192, at 731. In other words, of all self-dealing transactions, Min finds that a
majority received disinterested director approval. The proportion of such transactions for
which disinterested directors’ approval was sought must have been higher, unless disinterested
directors approved every transaction they were asked to review. Min does not comment on
this proportion.
229. Bank of Am. Corp., Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A) 31 (Mar. 12, 2018),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/70858/000119312518078695/d501004ddef14a.ht
m [https://perma.cc/2ANS-NBZJ]. The policy provides for pre-approval of certain
transactions not considered to create or involve a material conflict of interest. Id.
230. See Corporate Governance Guidelines, BANK AM. CORP. (Oct. 25, 2017), http://
investor.bankofamerica.com/static-files/652e9258-edfd-45b4-ae45-62fc54e4d2fc
[https://
perma.cc/LS7T-7EBL].
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Under the U.K. no-conflict regime, interested directors can look to either
of two exceptions: ad hoc shareholder approval or disclosure of interests to
fellow directors. In light of the analysis under the fairness rule, the former
exception would seem more difficult to satisfy, offering interested directors
less of any surplus generated by the transaction. Shareholders may be a less
forgiving audience than one’s fellow directors as they would make their
decision under public scrutiny, on an up-or-down basis with little scope for
bargaining, and a negative vote may damage interested directors’ reputations
and embarrass them. In the U.K. context, institutional investors can be
sensitive to the risk of reputational harm that can occur if they are regarded
as exercising weak oversight, making this exception unappealing.231
In the United Kingdom, it is difficult to get a picture of directors’ actual
practices because of more limited public corporate disclosures.
Nevertheless, some empirical texture is provided by directors’ conduct in
management buyouts (MBOs), which suggests that directors act in accord
with the incentives created by these exceptions.232 MBOs represent classic
self-dealing because fiduciaries who manage the corporation participate in
some fashion in a consortium buying the corporation. These transactions
have occurred frequently in the United Kingdom and United States,233 where
major financial firms exist precisely to do these deals, operating on the
premise that these self-dealing transactions can and will occur without
significant legal obstacles.234 In both the United Kingdom and United States,
committees of disinterested directors perform central roles. In fact, it is
virtually taken for granted in these transactions that an MBO process will be
managed by a committee of disinterested or independent directors.235
Though shareholder approval may be required under other rules, transaction

231. I thank David Kershaw for suggesting this reason in the U.K. context.
232. While Delaware courts have not explicitly characterized MBOs as self-dealing
transactions, scholars tend to regard them as such. See Guhan Subramaniam, Deal Process
Design in Management Buyouts, 130 HARV. L. REV. 590, 650–53 (2016) (discussing the
scholarly view that cases decided under section 144 provide the framework for MBOs).
233. See, e.g., Getting a Take Private off the Ground in the UK, GIBSON DUNN (Dec. 18,
2018),
https://www.gibsondunn.com/getting-a-take-private-off-the-ground-in-the-uk/
[https://perma.cc/FK9V-W3A3] (referring to the “gather[ing] pace” of take-privates in the
United Kingdom).
234. Private equity firms often instigate MBOs by approaching incumbent management,
seeking to have them participate in a deal to buy the company. Major law firms have practice
areas devoted to advising the managers, companies, and private equity firms that participate
in these transactions.
235. As to the United States, see generally Matthew D. Cain & Steven M. Davidoff, Form
over Substance: The Value of Corporate Process and Management Buy-Outs, 36 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 849 (2011) and Lawrence Lederman & Barry A. Bryer, Representing a Public
Company in a Leveraged Buyout Transaction, in LEVERAGED MANAGEMENT BUYOUTS:
CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 111 (Yakov Amihud ed., 1989). See also Subramaniam, supra
note 232, at 650–53 (2016). As to the United Kingdom, see Graham Gibb & Charles Martin,
Public-to-Privates, in PRIVATE EQUITY: A TRANSACTIONAL ANALYSIS 221, 232 (Chris Hale
ed., 3d ed. 2015) (“[O]ne of the first steps in any management buy-out is for the target board
to constitute an independent committee of directors.”).
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planning puts heavy reliance on disinterested director approval to address
concerns about directorial self-dealing.236
Given these choices, the latter exception—disclosure to fellow directors—
would be more appealing to satisfy than the alternative. It would offer
interested directors a greater share of any surplus a self-dealing transaction
generates, and we would expect interested directors to gravitate toward using
it.
Table 4 suggests a ranking of exceptions, in order of decreasing
attractiveness for interested directors, showing under each regime the appeal
of disinterested director approval by disinterested or fellow directors.
Table 4: Exceptions Ranked in Order of Decreasing Attractiveness for
Fiduciaries to Satisfy
U.S. Fairness Rule
1. Disclose self-dealing to
board/committee of directors and
obtain disinterested approval
2. Disclose self-dealing to
shareholders and obtain their
approval
3. Prove entire fairness

U.K. No-Conflict Rule237
1. Disclose self-dealing to fellow
directors238
2. Disclose self-dealing to
shareholders and obtain their
approval

In sum, in the United States, interested directors would tend to seek
disinterested director approval to protect against the loyalty rule, while in the
United Kingdom they would tend to disclose their interest to fellow directors.
If interested directors act on these incentives, the U.K. and U.S. fiduciary
regimes would operate similarly, despite differences in their substantive
formulations. These regimes create incentives for interested directors to use
exceptions that put unconflicted or neutral directors in the position of
policing self-dealing.
C. Relevance of Fairness
Given these incentives, what real-world relevance does proof of fairness
hold for interested directors? This exception may matter, but far less than
commentators have generally assumed, because interested directors have
236. Other rules, common law, statutory, and regulatory, will apply to MBOs and these
rules’ effects on deal process design are difficult to disentangle. For example, directors may
also owe fiduciary duties requiring them to maximize their sale price, under so-called Revlon
duties in the United States and equivalent duties in the United Kingdom.
237. Under the no-conflict rule, companies have broad freedom to adopt exceptions in their
corporate charters—other than those shown in this table—although there appears to have been
no widespread practice of them doing or having done so.
238. Under the common law regime, this exception very frequently appeared in corporate
charters. See supra notes 157–80 and accompanying text (explaining the widespread usage of
these exceptions). Under contemporary statutory law, this exception is embedded in section
177. See infra Part III.E.

2019]

REASSESSING SELF-DEALING

977

weak incentives to use it and because its existence is unlikely to influence
the conduct of the various actors involved, including interested directors.
Under the fairness regime, a director always has the opportunity to protect
a self-dealing transaction by proving that it was fair. The question is how
this unique exception affects the comparison of regimes, since the no-conflict
regime does not include a corresponding exception.
To begin, one might think that by offering fairness review, only the U.S.
regime provides an ex post means of legal absolution, that is, an exception
available after self-dealing has occurred. But in the United Kingdom (as in
the United States), shareholders can ratify self-dealing transactions ex post.
In the abstract, it is not evident which of these exceptions—proof of fairness
or shareholder approval—would pose the greater barrier for an interested
director. Neither exception is particularly appealing for directors. In the
United Kingdom, the board might refuse to put the matter to shareholders;
shareholder meetings are costly, especially for major public companies239
and even proposing the resolution might cast the board in a negative light.
Even if shareholders did have the opportunity to vote on the issue, the
outcome would be uncertain. In the United States, proving fairness is
expensive for interested directors and, again, the result is uncertain. Under
both regimes, the better the transaction for the company, the better the
prospects for interested directors. But interested directors nevertheless have
powerful incentives to invoke exceptions before the transaction occurs by
informing their disinterested directors and, in the United States, also seeking
their approval.
This does not mean that the regimes will always operate identically.240 In
some cases the only available cleansing device in the United States may be
fairness. Consider, for example, the family-owned and directed company
that transacts with a related family company having the same individuals as
directors; no disinterested directors or disinterested shareholders may exist
to cleanse the self-dealing.241 In the United Kingdom, shareholder approval
may be available under the common law on these facts since it imposes no
requirement that such approval be by disinterested shareholders, in contrast
to the U.S. position.242
Consider next the opportunistic director who fails to get director or
shareholder approval before engaging in self-dealing. In the United
Kingdom, directors would be unlikely to put the transaction to a shareholder
vote, and informed-shareholder approval would seem remote in any case. In
239. See LAW COMM’N & SCOTTISH LAW COMM’N, supra note 178, at 44 (“There are
substantial costs to approval and ratification, in particular in the case of large listed
companies.”).
240. Cf. Brown, supra note 213, at 54 (arguing that giving effect to director approval of
self-dealing transactions has “rendered fairness irrelevant”).
241. For a similar fact pattern, see, for example, Lewis v. S. L. & E., Inc., 629 F.2d 764
(2d Cir. 1980). My thanks to Randall Thomas for this insight.
242. As to the U.K. common law, see supra notes 135–36 and accompanying text; as to the
contemporary statutory position, see infra note 277 and accompanying text. As to the U.S.
position, see supra note 117.
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the United States, might proof of fairness save her and the transaction? It is
in this scenario that the regimes may differ in operation. She would have to
rely on so thoroughly satisfying the price prong of the fairness test that a
court would allow the transaction to pass muster despite her opportunism.243
She may be vindicated; there are cases where proof of fairness has operated
in this way in which a transaction tainted by unfair dealing was nevertheless
entirely fair.244 But such fact patterns are exceptional. Only in rare instances
have pricing terms rendered a transaction entirely fair, despite interested
directors’ unfair dealings.245
In general, although the question is incapable of direct proof, it seems
doubtful that directors would be more likely to engage in self-dealing or in
more aggressive forms of self-dealing than they would in the absence of the
fairness exception. U.S. court judgments offer little hope to opportunistic or
rule-evading directors who later seek relief for self-dealing by appealing to
fairness.246 Judicial reluctance to offer relief for these directors is
understandable, given the equitable jurisdiction courts exercise in actions
alleging fiduciary breach. Courts of equity, like the Delaware Court of
Chancery, began as “courts of conscience,” placing high value in
propriety.247 Indeed, courts express reluctance to save self-dealing
transactions if they are the product of unfair dealing.248 Courts have ruled
that unfair dealing can “infect” a transaction’s price, compromising its
fairness.249 Unfair dealing can make “the burden of persuading the court of
the fairness of the terms . . . exceptionally difficult.”250 Moreover, “[m]erely
243. Even when an unfair process is used, “it is possible that the pricing terms [are] so fair
as to render the transaction entirely fair.” Valeant Pharm. Int’l v. Jerney, 921 A.2d 732, 748
(Del. Ch. 2007).
244. One circumstance where the no-conflict and fairness regimes would operate
differently is where “all of the directors are interested in the transaction (so that [disinterested
director approval] is unavailable), but where seeking shareholder approval . . . would be
cumbersome, expensive, and not really meaningful.” See CLARK, supra note 54, at 169.
245. See generally Marciano v. Nakash, 535 A.2d 400 (Del. 1987); ACP Master, Ltd. v.
Sprint Corp., C.A. No. 8508-VCL, 2017 WL 3421142 (Del. Ch. July 21, 2017); In re Trados
Inc. S’holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17 (Del. Ch. 2013); Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Sys., Inc., Civ. A.
No. 8748, 1995 WL 301403 (Del. Ch. Apr. 17, 1995), aff’d, 669 A.2d 79 (Del. 1995).
246. It is also unlikely that interested directors would bargain significantly differently when
seeking disinterested director or shareholder approval based on the availability of proof of
fairness. This is because courts are unlikely to upset the good faith decision of neutral
decision-making bodies. See infra note 253 and accompanying text.
247. Equitable courts’ regard for propriety found expression in maxims insisting that “those
who seek equity must do equity” and “those who come into equity must come with clean
hands.” See J. D. HEYDON ET AL., MEAGHER, GUMMOW & LEHANE’S EQUITY DOCTRINES AND
REMEDIES 74–84 (5th ed. 2015).
248. See, e.g., In re Nine Sys. Corp. S’holders Litig., Consol. C.A. No. 3940-VCN, 2014
WL 4383127, at *47 (Del. Ch. Sept. 4, 2014) (Vice Chancellor John W. Noble was “reluctant
to conclude that the [conflicted transaction], even if it was conducted at a fair price, was an
entirely fair transaction because of the grossly inadequate process employed by the
Defendants.”).
249. Bomarko, Inc. v. Int’l Telecharge, Inc., 794 A.2d 1161, 1183 (Del. Ch. 1999) (“[T]he
unfairness of the process also infects the fairness of the price.”).
250. Valeant Pharm. Int’l v. Jerney, 921 A.2d 732, 748 (Del. Ch. 2007) (“[W]here the
pricing terms of a transaction that is the product of an unfair process cannot be justified by
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showing that the . . . price was in the range of fairness . . . does not
necessarily satisfy the entire fairness burden when fiduciaries stand on both
sides of a transaction and manipulate the . . . process.”251 Courts also treat
the fairness inquiry as highly contextual, which means that any would-be
self-dealer will be unsure of his chances of prevailing in litigation. In
particular, judges identify no single fact pattern or definable circumstance in
which they will regard as entirely fair a transaction reached through unfair
dealing and so reinforce directors’ doubt as to whether any fact pattern will
pass muster.252 In short, the proof of fairness exception does not create
strong incentives for opportunistic behavior by interested directors. It should
not lead the fairness regime to operate significantly differently than the noconflict rule.
Some might think that the fairness exception will affect the comparison of
regimes by influencing the conduct of disinterested directors. Facing the risk
of judicial second-guessing to determine fairness, so the argument might go,
disinterested directors asked to approve a transaction may be more willing to
approve a transaction and give interested directors more of any surplus that
a transaction produces than they would without that risk. In turn, interested
directors could engage in more, or more aggressive, self-dealing than they
would under a regime without a fairness exception. Stated differently,
because they make decisions in the shadow of fairness review, disinterested
directors may be more permissive than they would be otherwise.
We do indeed suspect that disinterested directors asked to approve selfdealing transactions are lenient to the benefit of their fellow directors. But,
while the matter is also not susceptible to direct proof, it is doubtful that the
availability of fairness review significantly influences disinterested directors’
conduct. For interested directors, proof of fairness is, in general, a less
appealing means of protecting a transaction; it involves significant expense,
uncertainty of result, and public exposure. Moreover, courts respect the
decisions of neutral corporate decision makers and are unlikely to secondguess the informed, good-faith judgment of disinterested directors who have
refused to approve a self-dealing transaction.253 Disinterested directors have
reference to reliable markets or by comparison to substantial and dependable precedent
transactions, the burden of persuading the court of the fairness of the terms will be
exceptionally difficult.”).
251. William Penn P’ship v. Saliba, 13 A.3d 749, 758 (Del. 2011); see also Kahn v.
Tremont Corp., 694 A.2d 422, 432 (Del. 1997) (“[H]ere, the process is so intertwined with
price that under Weinberger’s unitary standard a finding that the price negotiated by the
Special Committee might have been fair does not save the result.”); HMG/Courtland Props.,
Inc. v. Gray, 749 A.2d 94, 116 (Del. Ch. 1999) (stating that prices “within the low end of the
range of possible prices that might have been paid in negotiated arm’s-length deals” were
“fair” in a “narrow sense” but not entirely fair when the “process was . . . anything but fair”).
252. For a hypothetical fact pattern, in obiter dictum, that “conceivably could” be entirely
fair, despite unfair dealing, see In re Dole Food Co. Stockholder Litigation, Consolidated C.A.
No. 8703-VCL, 2015 WL 5052214, at *34 n.26 (Del. Ch. Aug. 27, 2015). The fact pattern
involves “an altruistic controller” that wishes to eliminate minority shareholders “[f]or
idiosyncratic reasons.” Id.
253. See, e.g., J. Travis Laster, The Effect of Stockholder Approval on Enhanced Scrutiny,
40 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1443, 1448 (2014) (referring to “a natural reluctance to substitute
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little reason to fear that a court would protect a self-dealing transaction by
finding it fair when they have already refused to approve it (the same goes
for shareholders in deciding whether to approve a transaction, in light of
courts’ respect for decisions of neutral bodies). It would therefore seem
doubtful that fairness review influences disinterested directors’ conduct by
making them more permissive than they would be in the absence of the
fairness exception.
The two regimes may well operate differently under exceptional
circumstances. Still, even if the availability of the fairness exception
influences the conduct of directors, countervailing considerations, based on
other differences between the regimes, must be considered to identify
differences in how the regimes operate. As explained next, seeking neutral
directors’ approval may be more costly to invoke and more limited in effect
under the fairness regime than the no-conflict regime.254
Finally, there is no reason to think U.S. interested directors are less likely
to face challenge or that their self-dealing is less likely to face detection—at
least none based on the fiduciary rules themselves. Rather, given U.S.
litigiousness and the incentives of plaintiffs’ counsel,255 the opposite is more
likely, although these considerations are outside the focus of this Article. The
upshot is that the U.S. and U.K. exceptions create similar incentives for
rational and opportunistic interested directors alike.
D. Rigor in Fairness Review
Certain features of the fairness regime suggest that it may operate more
strictly than does the no-conflict rule and more strongly deter self-dealing
than the latter regime. First, U.S. courts searchingly scrutinize the
disinterestedness of directors approving a transaction, leading some scholars
to regard the requirement as one of independence.256 The counterpart U.K.
provision, by contrast, requires an interested director to inform “the other
directors” of his interest,257 without a disinterestedness condition or a
requirement for approval. Because “other directors” themselves owe their
own fiduciary duties, they must decide how to respond to the disclosure,
amounting to a form of approval if they fail to object, and yet less may be
required of them and of interested directors relative to the fairness regime.
Second, the fairness rule both requires that shareholder approval be by
judicial judgment for business persons’ decision making”); see also Bainbridge et al., supra
note 125, at 602 (“[E]ven in cases implicating loyalty claims, Delaware corporate law places
great emphasis on deference to director decisions.”).
254. See infra Part III.D.
255. See, e.g., Martin Gelter & Geneviève Helleringer, Corporate Opportunities in the U.S.
and in the U.K.: How Differences in Enforcement Explain Differences in Substantive
Fiduciary Duties, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 137, at 331.
256. See MELVIN ARON EISENBERG & JAMES D. COX, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS
ORGANIZATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 523 (10th ed. 2011) (“Even in Delaware, it may be
necessary to show that the directors who approved the transaction were not only disinterested,
but independent . . . .”).
257. Companies Act 2006, c. 46, § 177(1) (Eng.).
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disinterested shareholders and operates more strictly than otherwise on
directors who have voting control, while the common law no-conflict rule
neither prevents interested directors from voting their shares nor imposes
heightened requirements on directors with significant voting power.258
Finally, the fairness regime may operate more strictly than suggested
above because its exceptions may be more limited than those under the noconflict rule. For a time, courts suggested that the exceptions under section
144(a)(1) and (2) were less generous than suggested above.259 Rather than
giving BJR protection, these exceptions left self-dealing transactions
vulnerable to invalidation for unfairness.260 On this view, which prevails
outside Delaware,261 the fairness regime only permits transactions that are
fair to the corporation, even if they have been approved by disinterested
directors or shareholders. However, in Delaware this narrow view of the
effects of section 144(a)(1) and (2) seems confined to self-dealing
transactions involving interested directors with de jure or de facto voting
control.262
Even if the section 144(a)(1) or (2) exceptions provide business judgment
protection, recent cases suggest that transactions approved by disinterested
directors may satisfy section 144(a) and yet remain subject to review to
answer “[t]he somewhat different question of when an interested transaction
might give rise to a claim for breach of fiduciary duty—i.e., to a claim in
equity.”263 Determining that question requires resort to “the common law of
258. See supra notes 182–85 and accompanying text. Under the contemporary statutory
position, votes cast by interested directors to retrospectively approve (or ratify) their own
conduct are disregarded, a change from the common law position. See infra Part III.E. This
difference between the regimes is diminished under the common law to the extent that U.K.
companies adopted charter provisions limiting directors from voting as shareholders to
approve their own self-dealing. I am aware of no widespread practice of companies adopting
provisions to this effect.
259. See supra Part II.B.
260. On this view the exceptions saved interested directors from having to prove fairness
to escape the loyalty rule. See Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1134, 1154 (Del.
Ch. 1994) (“[C]ompliance with the terms of Section 144 does not restore to the board the
presumption of the business judgment rule; it simply shifts the burden to plaintiff to prove
unfairness.”). Oddly, as authority, the court cited Kahn v. Lynch Communication Systems,
Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1154 (Del. 1994), a case involving an interested merger by a controlling
shareholder transaction, rather than a classic self-dealing transaction and to which section 144
was not directly applicable (nor cited in the decision). See also CLARK, supra note 54, at 169
(rejecting the proposition under Delaware law that a section 144–approved transaction “is
completely shielded from shareholder attack and that a court is precluded by the statute from
examining the fairness of the transaction and possibly invalidating it”); Davies, supra note 27,
at n.48 (“Delaware has a general scrutiny mechanism in place in the shape of court review of
substantive fairness of the transaction, even if it has been approved by the board.”).
261. EISENBERG & COX, supra note 256, at 523 (“It is widely believed . . . at least outside
Delaware approval by disinterested directors will not prevent a court from reviewing selfinterested transactions for obvious unfairness.”).
262. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
263. In re Cox Commc’ns, Inc. S’holders Litig., 879 A.2d 604, 615 (Del. Ch. 2005); see
also Cumming v. Edens, C.A. No. 13007-VCS, 2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 54, at *46 (Del. Ch.
Feb. 20, 2018) (“I am satisfied that compliance with Section 144(a)(1) does not necessarily
invoke business judgment review of an interested transaction.”). For a more detailed
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corporations.”264 That law “looked much like that codified in Section
144,”265 but not exactly, with the result that a transaction might gain section
144 protection but give rise to fiduciary liability. Under this approach, courts
consider the questions of invalidity and fiduciary breach separately; for each
question, distinct (though similar) exceptions apply. On this reasoning,
disinterested director approval operates more strictly than its U.K.
counterpart because “[c]ompliance with Section 144(a)(1) does not
necessarily invoke business judgment review of an interested transaction.”266
Under some circumstances, therefore, the fairness regime may operate more
strictly than does the no-conflict regime.267
E. U.K. Codification
Recall that the Companies Act 2006 largely codified the substantive
content of directors’ fiduciary duties, imposing general duties on directors
that are “based on” rules and principles under the general law.268 For selfdealing transactions, section 177 of the statute requires interested directors to
disclose the nature and extent of their interest in a proposed transaction or
arrangement with the company to their fellow board members.269 The
consequences of breaching section 177 “are the same as would apply if the
corresponding common law rule or equitable principle applied”270—an
apparent reference to the consequences of breaching the common law noconflict rule, rather than the former statutory disclosure duty (first introduced

explanation of this view, see Rohrbacher et al., supra note 97, at 719–22 (arguing that analysis
under section 144 is distinct from that to determine fiduciary breach).
264. Cox Commc’ns, 879 A.2d at 615.
265. Id.
266. Cumming, 2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 54, at *49.
267. Another potential difference is the scope of the transactions to which the fiduciary
regimes apply. Some sources suggest that the U.S. fairness regime applies somewhat
narrowly, only to those self-dealing transactions for which interested directors vote. See supra
note 97. The U.K. loyalty rule also imposes restrictions: it applies to the “real [and] sensible
possibility of conflict,” a requirement that may minimize any difference in the range of selfdealing transactions to which the regimes apply. See Hosp Prods Ltd v US Surgical Corp
(1984) 156 CLR 41, 103 (Austl.) (requiring a “real or substantial possibility of a conflict”);
Boardman v. Phipps [1967] 2 AC 46 (HL) 124 (Lord Upjohn, dissenting) (Eng.) (requiring
“real sensible possibility of conflict”). This qualification reduces the ambit of the no-conflict
rule. It may even introduce flexibility into the U.K. loyalty rule. David Kershaw, Lost in
Translation: Corporate Opportunities in Comparative Perspective, 25 OXFORD J. LEGAL
STUD. 603, 623–24 (2005).
268. Companies Act 2006, c. 46, § 170(3) (Eng.).
269. Id. § 177(1); see PALMER’S COMPANY LAW, supra note 37, ¶ 8.3104 (asserting that
section 177 of the Companies Act 2006 “abolishes the application of the equitable no-conflict
and no-profit rules”). While the no-conflict rule is eliminated for self-dealing transactions,
under section 175 it survives in other settings, “in particular” those involving the exploitation
of corporate property, information, and opportunities. See Companies Act 2006, c. 46,
§ 175(2). The surviving no-conflict rule is expressed not to apply to self-dealing transactions.
Id. § 175(3).
270. Companies Act 2006, c. 46, § 178(1) (Eng.).
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in 1928).271 Correspondingly, compliance with section 177 saves a selfdealing transaction from the remedial consequences of breaching the noconflict rule, most notably rescission.272 To be sure, the statute requires
interested directors to disclose the nature and extent of their self-dealing273
and does not expressly forbid self-dealing. In function, however, the
disclosure duty encompasses both a loyalty rule and an exception: it
invalidates self-dealing transactions (imposing “the same” consequences as
under the common law), unless interested directors disclose their interests to
their board colleagues.274
The statute creates other exceptions. First, companies may change the
operation of section 177 through their charters. Under section 180(4)(b),
where a “company’s articles contain provisions dealing with conflicts of
interest, [the general duties] are not infringed by anything done (or omitted)
by the directors, or any of them, in accordance with these provisions.”275
Second, shareholders may give approval for conduct that would otherwise
amount to fiduciary breach, before or after the conduct.276 In the case of
retrospective approval (ratification) but not prospective approval
(authorization), the statute disregards votes cast by interested directors to
approve their own conduct, a notable change from the common law.277
In practical effect, the regime largely mirrors the common law. It imposes
a strict loyalty rule and creates exceptions. The regime renders self-dealing
transactions voidable, requiring undivided loyalty. But it relieves interested
directors of liability if they disclose their interests to fellow directors (as
required by the statutory duty), obtain ad hoc shareholder approval for the
transaction, or satisfy an exception that the company has provided in its

271. Id. As to the statutory duty, see supra notes 167–71 and accompanying text. But this
interpretation regarding what is the “corresponding” rule or principle is somewhat contested.
See STAFFORD & RITCHIE, supra note 4, at 43–44.
272. The statute provides that the transaction or arrangement “is not liable to be set aside
by virtue of any common law or equitable principle requiring the consent or approval of
[shareholders]” if section 177 is observed. Companies Act 2006, c. 46, § 180(1) (Eng.).
273. See supra note 269 and accompanying text.
274. Another provision requires directors to disclose their interests in existing transactions
with the company, unless their interests have already been disclosed as required by section
177. Companies Act 2006, c. 46, § 182 (Eng.). In contrast to the position under section 177,
breach of section 182 attracts a fine but not the remedies available under common law or
equity for breach of the no-conflict rule. See id. § 183(1).
275. Id. § 180(4)(b). As under the common law regime, uncertainty exists as to how to
reconcile charter exceptions with statutory provisions that render void the terms that exempt
a director from liability for breach of duty or breach of trust. As to the common law position,
see supra note 137. Under the Companies Act 2006, section 232 includes a similar voiding
provision to previous legislation but ensures that charter exceptions may be adopted to the
extent they could under the common law. It provides that “[n]othing in this section prevents
a company’s articles from making such provision as has previously been lawful for dealing
with conflicts of interest.” Companies Act 2006, c. 46, § 232(1), (4) (Eng.).
276. Companies Act 2006, c. 46, § 180(4)(a) (Eng.).
277. See id. § 239(4). The reasons for this differential treatment of prospective and
retrospective shareholder approval are unclear. They stem from use of the word “ratification”
but not “authorization” in section 239.
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charter.278 The basic difference is that, although the common law allowed
interested directors to escape the loyalty rule via disclosure to disinterested
directors where the company’s charter included an exception to that effect,
the new regime expressly provides that exception, even when a corporate
charter omits it.
Today, the statute provides an exception that parties previously had to craft
for themselves, and often did.279 There is no reason to think that the statutory
regime operates significantly differently from the common law considered
above.
IV. IMPLICATIONS
A. Comparative Corporate Law Scholarship
The conclusions above undermine commonly expressed views about the
no-conflict and fairness rules.280 Claims of the no-conflict rule’s strictness
overlook the availability and widespread use of exceptions that relieve
interested directors of the loyalty rule’s remedial consequences as well as the
power of interested directors to vote their shares to approve their own selfdealing. This is not to say that the U.K. regime is actually lenient. It
effectively tasks neutral directors with policing self-dealing, a mechanism
under which fiduciary rules can discriminate between beneficial and harmful
deals more deftly than no conflict’s critics acknowledge.281 In its operation,
the regime has proven nuanced, management friendly, and attuned to the
inevitability of self-dealing.
Similarly, while scholars often point to proof of fairness as the primary
feature that distinguishes U.K. and U.S. fiduciary law,282 the exception is
unlikely to materially shift directors’ incentives. In the United States,
directors have powerful incentives—on which they act—to obtain
disinterested director approval for their self-dealing. The fairness rule has
operated similarly to the no-conflict rule, with interested directors usually
seeking their disinterested colleagues’ approval for self-dealing.
Accordingly, traditional characterizations of these rules—of the fairness rule
as more pragmatic, better calibrated to deter self-dealing, and attuned to the
needs of commerce, or of the no-conflict rule as more rigorous—are
incomplete and generally mistaken. For similar reasons, claims that the
exception for fairness has diminished the force of fiduciary law or had
pernicious effects283 overlook the availability of other exceptions, disregard
278. Under section 180(5) of Companies Act 2006, section 177 has effect “except as
otherwise provided or the context otherwise requires.” Id. § 180(5).
279. But parties may still privately craft exceptions in their charters, as they could under
the common law regime (but rarely did, it seems).
280. See supra Part II.D (surveying the scholarly views).
281. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
282. See Davies, supra note 27, at nn.30–31 (referring to “the development of a substantive
fairness assessment in the US and its absence in the UK” as “the crucial divergence between
US and English law”).
283. See supra notes 60–61 and accompanying text.
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the regime’s usual operation, and have in mind an idealized version of the
no-conflict rule as the basis for comparison.
Why has this long-standing scholarly debate failed to consider the practical
operation of the no-conflict and fairness rules? One must look at the actual
operation of the regimes to recognize their common loyalty rule and their full
range of exceptions and the similar incentives associated with their
exceptions. In the United Kingdom in particular, under the common law, one
must examine whether companies adopt charter terms to escape the loyalty
rule and, if so, on what terms. A couple of explanations are apparent.
First, cases examine a specific company’s governance practices, rather
than market-wide corporate practices and are often the subject of scholarly
focus, but it is market-wide practices that matter for comparative evaluation.
Second, self-dealing decisions that articulated the contours of the no-conflict
rule predated the widespread use of charter exceptions and focused on the
strict loyalty rule, stating that rule in emphatic terms. For instance, courts
and scholars alike continue to cite Aberdeen Railway Co. v. Blaikie Bros., the
mid-nineteenth-century case involving a company without a charter-altering
term. To the extent scholars cite this case and rely on its statements of
principle, they fail to appreciate that corporate practices had so changed to
routinely escape the loyalty rule, a market shift that significantly diminished
the influence of the loyalty rule relative to exceptions.
A similar bias may infect scholarly attention to U.S. court decisions. Just
as loyalty has not defined the no-conflict regime’s operation, proof of
fairness has not defined the U.S. regime’s operation. Indeed, to comply with
securities laws, public companies generally require interested directors to
disclose their self-dealing to a committee of their disinterested colleagues.
Yet scholarly focus on U.S. case law can obscure this conclusion. Celebrated
cases focus on the requirements for fairness and the rigor of courts’ scrutiny
when they undertake fairness review.
B. The False Choice Between No Conflict and Fairness
More broadly, the study of the no-conflict and fairness rules in corporate
law should lead us to reject the false choice between no conflict and fairness
and to focus instead on the structure and operation of the rules and therefore,
in many fiduciary settings, on the availability and use of exceptions.284 In
284. Of course, there is nothing inevitable about the conclusion that the no-conflict and
fairness rules will operate similarly as they do under U.S. and U.K. corporate law or that any
differences will exist in their available cleansing devices. My thanks to Holger Spamann for
this insight. U.K. companies might have adopted altogether different cleansing devices in
their corporate charters or none at all. Similarly, it was not inevitable that Delaware would
have made the duty of loyalty for self-dealing mandatory, preventing parties from adopting
more relaxed cleansing devices than those already available. Indeed, parties forming limited
liability companies have significant ability to craft their own cleansing devices and even to
alter the loyalty rule itself—flexibility that they often use. See generally Suren Gomstian,
Contractual Mechanisms of Investor Protection in Non-listed Limited Liability Companies,
60 VILL. L. REV. 955 (2016); Mohsen Manesh, Contractual Freedom Under Delaware
Alternative Entity Law: Evidence from Publicly Traded LPs and LLCs, 37 J. CORP. L. 555
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comparisons of trust law’s no-conflict rule with corporate law’s fairness rule,
for example, this analytical approach would require us to examine the full
range of exceptions under both rules. In trust law, these include the ability
of settlors and beneficiaries to authorize or consent to conflict transactions
and thereby exclude the strict requirement for loyalty.285 Although many
regard trust law’s approach toward self-dealing as stricter than the approach
under corporate law, one must examine the operation of exceptions before
concluding that either rule dominates the other in its rigor, pragmatism, or
ability to differentiate between harmful and nonharmful conflicts. Indeed,
parties do invoke these exceptions in trust law, just as they do in corporate
law, excluding the otherwise strict operation of the fiduciary loyalty
regime.286
A consequence of this focus on the availability and use of exceptions may
lead us to question fiduciary scholars’ focus on loyalty. In fiduciary doctrine,
loyalty is the “distinguishing obligation,” “defining concept,” and “overriding duty.”287 The doctrinal requirement for loyalty reflects the concern
that fiduciaries will prefer their own interests over those of their
beneficiaries, a concern that “echoed down the centuries”288 and found
expression originally in the no-conflict rule. Scholarship reflects this

(2012); Peter Molk, How Do LLC Owners Contract Around Default Statutory Protections?,
42 J. CORP. L. 503 (2017).
285. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170(1) cmt. t (AM. LAW INST. 1959); id.
§ 216(1).
286. In debating the merits of the no-conflict (or sole-interest) and fairness (or best-interest)
rules, Langbein and Leslie acknowledge that settlors and beneficiaries can and sometimes do
approve conflicts. Langbein, supra note 6, at 963–65; Leslie, supra note 7, at 565. However,
they draw differing conclusions; to Langbein, such approval shows that some conflicts
produce no harm, Langbein, supra note 6, at 938–39, 963–65; to Leslie, such approval is
evidence that the no-conflict rule is more “efficient,” Leslie, supra note 7, at 565. Neither
claims, however, that the extent to which settlors and beneficiaries in fact approve conflicts,
thereby exempting the underlying loyalty rule, determines how similarly or differently the
rules operate in practice. Moreover, Langbein suggests that exemptions to the sole-interest
rule result in that rule operating akin to a best-interest rule, Langbein, supra note 6, at 963–
68, but still regards the former rule as overdeterring relative to the latter. Langbein, supra note
6, at 951–52, 958–62.
287. Mothew v. Bristol & W. Bldg. Soc’y [1996] 75 P & CR 241 at 254 (Eng.) (The
“distinguishing obligation of a fiduciary is the obligation of loyalty.”); Australian Sec & Invs
Comm’n v Citigroup Glob Mkts Austl Pty Ltd [No. 4] (2007) 160 FCR 35, 78 (Austl.) (“The
distinguishing or over-riding duty of a fiduciary is the obligation of undivided loyalty . . . .”);
MATTHEW CONAGLEN, FIDUCIARY LOYALTY: PROTECTING THE DUE PERFORMANCE OF NONFIDUCIARY DUTIES 1 (2010) (“The concept of loyalty is now well established as the core—
indeed the defining—concept of fiduciary doctrine.”).
288. FINN, supra note 31, at 200.
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concern: scholars debate the functions289 and content290 that duties of loyalty
perform and how these duties would apply in new settings.291
However, if fiduciaries routinely use exceptions, they avoid the operation
of loyalty rules. They free themselves to act in ways that would otherwise
amount to fiduciary breach even though they remain fiduciaries. This
description seems to characterize the U.K. and U.S. corporate experiences,
though for different reasons. In the United Kingdom, corporate fiduciary law
was amenable to alteration by corporate charters, whereas Delaware
fiduciary law evolved to permit generous exceptions that were later enshrined
in statute. Although celebrated U.K. cases illustrate the apparent strictness
and inflexibility of the no-conflict rule, the relevant companies were
probably outliers in having failed to include exceptions in their charters. In
general, there has been little pretense that self-dealing transactions actually
were banned or even that shareholder approval was needed under fiduciary
law; the United Kingdom’s thriving MBO market illustrates the point. The
no-conflict rule has rarely been a serious bulwark against self-dealing
because fiduciaries have typically invoked exceptions. The U.S. fairness rule
has operated similarly, not because interested directors have proved the
fairness of their self-dealing but because they sought disinterested director
approval, an exception roughly mirroring the widely available U.K.
exception.
When parties routinely invoke exceptions, we would expect those rules,
rather than the underlying loyalty rule, to shape fiduciaries’ conduct.292
Corporate law and trust law are not the only areas where this occurs. Major
financial conglomerates routinely rely on exceptions to conduct their
business; given the fiduciary duties they owe across their varied business
activities, they probably could not otherwise conduct the range of businesses
they do.293 But what conduct do exceptions require of fiduciaries before
permitting self-dealing? Before giving their informed approval, for example,
what do disinterested directors or shareholders require? To understand the
289. For example, Matthew Conaglen regards fiduciary duties as performing the particular
prophylactic role of ensuring that nonfiduciary duties are more likely to be performed.
CONAGLEN, supra note 287, at 61.
290. See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 6, at 103–05; Andrew S. Gold, The
Loyalties of Fiduciary Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note
131, at 176, 178–88.
291. See, e.g., Christine Sgarlata Chung, Municipal Securities: The Crisis of State and
Local Government Indebtedness, Systemic Costs of Low Default Rates, and Opportunities for
Reform, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 1455, 1519–36 (2013) (examining whether advisors owe
fiduciary duties to municipalities issuing securities); Angela C. Walch, Call Blockchain
Developers What They Are:
Fiduciaries, AM. BANKER (Aug. 9, 2016),
https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/call-blockchain-developers-what-they-arefiduciaries [https://perma.cc/YLB5-DJSA] (arguing that developers of public blockchains
owe fiduciary duties).
292. See Getzler, supra note 131, at 61–62.
293. See generally Andrew F. Tuch, The Weakening of Fiduciary Law, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 137, at 354 (examining the tangled web of
conflicting duties and interests that large financial conglomerates owe and the measures they
adopt, including exceptions, to prevent fiduciary breach).
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practical force of fiduciary law, scholars may do better to focus more on
exceptions and how they shape fiduciaries’ behavior than on the default
requirement of loyalty.
None of this is to suggest fiduciary doctrine operates suboptimally. Selfdealing may benefit or harm corporations. Few scholars would categorically
ban self-dealing (permitting no exceptions), and for good reason, given the
breadth of what constitutes self-dealing.294 The question is not whether we
should have exceptions but how we should craft them to protect and promote
beneficiaries’ interests. One interesting feature of the U.K. experience is that
under the common law shareholders approved an exception that gave neutral
directors power to police self-dealing, despite the associated risks. Their
approval may reflect their preferences for such a rule and be evidence of the
rule’s efficiency, although the question of efficiency depends on the integrity
of various market mechanisms.295 U.S. courts, in adopting a similar
exception, may have adopted a rule that is value-maximizing. And, at a more
granular level of analysis, certain differences between the regimes would
need to be accounted for in determining optimality. These include the
probability that a plaintiff will challenge a self-dealing transaction, levels of
institutional investor oversight, and constraints imposed by reputation and
the market for corporation control—all issues beyond the scope of this
Article’s analysis.
C. The Arc of Fiduciary Law
These insights complicate other inquiries in corporate law scholarship.
Scholars have claimed both that the early U.S. no-conflict rule reflected the
U.K. no-conflict rule296 and that, as the U.S. rule evolved toward the fairness
rule, it became less strict, permitting self-dealing that it previously
prohibited.297 But the conclusion in this Article—that the U.S. fairness and
U.K. no-conflict rules operate similarly in fundamental respects—casts doubt
on either or both of these historical claims. How could U.S. law both have
imported the U.K. no-conflict rule and have significantly weakened as it
evolved toward fairness?
Distinguishing between loyalty rules and exceptions helps illuminate
weaknesses in these claims and direct future research. First, the early U.S.
no-conflict rule was probably less strict than many suggest. Often citing
Harold Marsh, Jr., scholars refer to that rule as a blanket restriction on
conflicts.298 For his part, Marsh regarded this rule as “absolutely inhibiting
294. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
295. For a discussion of the considerations, see supra note 190 and accompanying text.
296. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
297. See supra notes 58–60 and accompanying text. David Kershaw refers to “the
contemporary article of faith that [U.S.] fiduciary standards have progressively declined since
the introduction of general incorporation.” Kershaw, supra note 19, at 440.
298. See, e.g., Hill & McDonnell, supra note 125, at 909 (“[A]t traditional common law,
interested transactions were void and could not be remedied.”); Celia R. Taylor, The
Inadequacy of Fiduciary Duty Doctrine: Why Corporate Managers Have Little to Fear and
What Might Be Done About It, 85 OR. L. REV. 993, 1009 (2017) (“To encourage appropriate
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contracts between a corporation and its directors.”299 But even he admitted
the early U.S. no-conflict rule was subject to exceptions or cleansing
devices.300 Later, in an influential paper, referring to nineteenth-century
cases that applied the early U.S. no-conflict rule, he observed:
One factor which we have not yet mentioned is the effect under any of the
rules discussed above of shareholder ratification of the transaction, after
full disclosure, even though it might otherwise have been automatically
voidable because it did not meet the standards required for director action.
All of the cases seem to hold that such ratification will suffice to validate
the transaction with an interested director, at least in the absence of fraud
or unfairness.301

In other words, Marsh recognized that the very no-conflict rule he considered
absolute was in fact subject to exceptions.
Second, Marsh identified another important feature of the early U.S. noconflict rule regarding exceptions. In describing the availability of
shareholder approval, he claimed that U.S. law permitted interested directors
to vote their shares qua shareholders to approve their own self-dealing: “the
stock of the interested director or directors may be voted on the question of
ratification, and as shareholders they may cast the deciding votes.”302 Citing
English authorities for this U.S. legal proposition, he suggested that early
U.S. law mirrored U.K. law in this critical respect, but his legal analysis
failed to account for this proposition. Accordingly, he did not see that the
early U.S. no-conflict rule, as he formulated it, offered weak constraints on
self-dealing by interested directors with significant voting power,
significantly weaker constraints than those under the contemporary fairness
rule.303
Third, Marsh failed to consider whether early U.S. law also allowed U.K.style charter terms to exempt the loyalty rule and, if so, whether they were
used. Put differently, how completely did U.S. law reflect the corresponding
U.K. rule? Strangely, Marsh only considered the position under midtwentieth-century law, explaining that the U.S. no-conflict rule
is qualified by the fact that the particular corporation may have a provision
in its articles of incorporation or by-laws permitting such transactions. It is
common knowledge that this is a standard provision inserted in corporate
fiduciary behavior, the [duty of loyalty] originally imposed a blanket prohibition on selfinterested transactions . . . . It made no difference if disinterested directors or shareholders
approved the transaction nor if the director or officer could prove that it was fair. The law was
inflexible in its application . . . .”); Julian Velasco, A Defense of the Corporate Law Duty of
Care, 40 J. CORP. L. 647, 687 (2015) (“Long ago, the duty of loyalty was much more robust:
conflicts were essentially prohibited.”); Velasco, supra note 97, at 1240 (“Taken to its logical
conclusion, the duty of loyalty could require that directors never have any conflicts of interest.
Essentially, that was once the state of the law.”).
299. Marsh, supra note 4, at 39.
300. Id. at 48.
301. Id. (emphasis added).
302. Id. at 48–49 (citing, among other authorities, leading English authority, North-West
Transportation Co. v. Beatty (1887) 12 App. Cas. 589 (PC) (appeal taken from Can.)).
303. As to which, see generally Marsh, supra note 4.
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articles by all corporate law firms. And the courts have held that such
provisions are effective at least to negative any automatic voidability of the
transactions covered.304

Kenneth Davis considers the U.S. position even earlier than Marsh. He
observes that, by the 1930s, U.S. corporate charters and bylaws “frequently
included” provisions allowing self-dealing by directors and that “such
provisions were regularly upheld by the courts.”305 David Kershaw
addresses the position earlier still, examining whether such charter terms,
which he calls “opt outs,” were part of the U.S. no-conflict rule. Focusing
on New Jersey law, then the most important corporate law jurisdiction, he
observes, “it appears that New Jersey corporations and shareholders may
have adopted contractual opt-outs from the strict rule in their constitutional
documents, [but] it is unclear at what point in time this practice
commenced.”306 If such contractual terms existed, “it seems highly unlikely
that the earlier cases would have been receptive to contracting out of the
voidability principle.”307 He bases this view on U.S. courts’ “understanding”
of the corporation “as a product of legislative action,” which suggests that
limits be placed on parties’ capacity to change corporate rules.308
This still leaves open the questions of whether such terms in fact existed
in corporate charters and, if so, whether directors and shareholders operated
as if they had effect—questions that cannot be resolved by considering
judicial opinions. Did these terms exclude the operation of the loyalty rule
or adopt the more tailored U.K. approach of conditionally excluding the
loyalty rule, that is, of adopting an exception that prevented the rule from
operating if interested directors disclosed their self-dealing to their fellow
directors? Even if courts would have rejected charter terms excluding the
loyalty rule, would they have permitted these more tailored terms? These
questions are fundamental to how we regard the U.S. no-conflict rule and,
therefore, how we characterize the evolution of U.S. fiduciary law. They
deserve further inquiry. Instead, much of the scholarship has focused on
whether early U.S. law admitted fairness review,309 but the real question for
understanding the arc of fiduciary law is whether early U.S. law in fact
reflected the U.K. position, including all its exceptions—a question Marsh
does not seem to have considered other than by acknowledging the role of
shareholder approval. At a minimum, Marsh’s characterization of U.S. selfdealing law from the late nineteenth century on—as having “progressed from

304. Id. at 45.
305. Davis, supra note 216, at 222 (citing cases). Davis observes that these charter and
bylaw provisions “authoriz[ed] contracts with directors.” Id.
306. See Kershaw, supra note 19, at 457.
307. Id. at 458; see also id. at 457 (“It is also important to distinguish [the terms’] adoption
from their effectiveness.”).
308. See id. at 404–05. Kershaw regards the noncontractibilty of the loyalty rule as a
“settled legal principle” but acknowledges early cases in which the loyalty rule was
contractually altered in “limited” respects. See id. at 458 n.206.
309. See, e.g., Beveridge, supra note 51.
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condemnation, to toleration, to encouragement of conflict of interest”310—
seems significantly overstated given the analysis he offers.
A related issue concerns when and why U.S. courts began prohibiting
companies from excluding the loyalty rule in their charters. Recall that
contemporary Delaware law treats the fairness rule, and therefore its loyalty
rule, as mandatory,311 a change from earlier law as described by Marsh and
Davis.312 Scholars arguing that fiduciary law has weakened in the stages that
Marsh describes must also contend with the mandatory nature of the loyalty
rule for self-dealing in Delaware.
It is nevertheless apparent that the evolution has been toward convergence
with U.K. fiduciary law, not divergence, in a fundamental respect. The big
change in U.S. law occurred when courts expressly acknowledged that
disinterested directors could approve self-dealing. According to Marsh, by
1910, a “general rule” protected self-dealing transactions from invalidity if
they were approved by a disinterested majority of directors and were neither
unfair nor fraudulent.313 Later, some states, including Delaware (in section
144), adopted statutes protecting self-dealing transactions if they received
disinterested director approval.314 In adopting this exception, U.S. law came
more closely to resemble the U.K. law’s operation, which had already
achieved significant flexibility by tasking neutral directors with policing selfdealing. Far from rejecting a stricter U.K. law, U.S. law followed the United
Kingdom’s lead.
David Kershaw has recently offered a competing account of the
development of U.S. self-dealing law, rejecting Marsh’s analysis.315 The
United Kingdom and United States had identical starting points—a strict rule
that prohibited self-dealing by directors in the absence of informed
shareholder approval. However, the laws “rapidly diverged.”316 Facing
commercial pressure, U.K. courts gave effect to provisions in corporate
constitutions that permitted self-dealing that the strict no-conflict rule would
otherwise prohibit; such provisions became common, easing the severity of
the strict rule. Although U.S. courts faced similar pressure, they responded
differently, initially in New Jersey and New York and later in Delaware, by
drawing on fairness principles. Kershaw’s analysis is insightful, showing,
310. Marsh, supra note 4, at 57.
311. Under Delaware law, corporations may alter doctrine that forbids directors taking
corporate opportunities. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 122(17) (2019). For an empirical study
of the extent to which companies have used the rule, see Gabriel Rauterberg & Eric Talley,
Contracting Out of the Fiduciary Duty of Loyalty: An Empirical Analysis of Corporate
Opportunity Waivers, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 1075 (2017).
312. See supra notes 304–05 and accompanying text.
313. Marsh, supra note 4, at 40.
314. Id. at 48. Marsh does not date these statutes. By way of reference, the Delaware
provision (section 144(a)) was adopted in 1967. Although citing statutes that permitted selfdealing that received disinterested director approval, Marsh summarizes the law as permitting
self-dealing “subject only to possible invalidation for unfairness.” Id.
315. DAVID KERSHAW, THE FOUNDATIONS OF ANGLO-AMERICAN CORPORATE FIDUCIARY
LAW 285–368 (2018).
316. Id. at 285.
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among other things, how U.S. fiduciary law responded differently to
commercial pressures, locating that response in fairness principles. But the
analysis in this Article suggests instead that proof of fairness does not reflect
a flexible approach similar to that adopted in the United Kingdom; the
development of disinterested director approval and the relative severity of
fairness review brought the United States into alignment with the United
Kingdom.
D. Explaining Differences and Similarities
Accepting Marsh’s characterization of the evolution of fiduciary law,
scholars often ask why the law changed as it did. Robert C. Clark suggests
that the evolution in U.S. fiduciary law may be due to “judicial
enlightenment” or legal learning: after courts observed “a greater number
and variety of self-dealing transactions,” they realized that “certain selfdealing transactions might be not only normal and virtually unpreventable
but also positively better than comparable other-dealing, or market,
transactions.”317 On this view, courts “adopted more selective rules in order
to allow the nonabusive self-dealing transactions to occur.”318 But legal
learning might have occurred through another mechanism. U.S. judges may
have been aware of the commercially friendly U.K. approach toward selfdealing and became more willing to permit self-dealing transactions (if that
is what they did) as a result. Critically, such learning might have left U.S.
judges more willing to give disinterested directors a central role in policing
self-dealing (which they certainly did). It is possible that, in adapting the law
to give disinterested directors a vital governance role in limiting self-dealing,
U.S. judges did little more than follow the lead of English fiduciary law. In
fact, this is precisely what U.S. judges did, whether they know it or not.
It is unsurprising that self-dealing law operates similarly in both
jurisdictions. Courts face significant institutional and market forces to render
commercially workable decisions. Both systems are centers of significant
economic activity, which may influence and be influenced by courts’
willingness to craft practical legal rules. Both jurisdictions fall within the
same legal family, as distinct from civil law jurisdictions, suggesting that
they may resolve common problems similarly.319
Still, the convergence is not total. U.K. law permits greater private
alteration of fiduciary duties than does U.S. law, a theme that reappears in

317. CLARK, supra note 54, at 164.
318. Id. Clark suggests two alternative explanations for the perceived weakening of U.S.
self-dealing law. These theories posit that managers and lawyers, respectively, convinced
courts to reshape self-dealing rules to permit greater self-dealing (benefiting managers) and
adopt more expensive legal rules (benefiting lawyers). Id. at 162–63. Clark gives most
credence to the judicial enlightenment theory.
319. See KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KOTZ, INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 63–73
(Tony Weir trans., 3d ed. 1998); Gerrit De Geest, Understanding French, German and Civil
Law More Generally, in LIBER AMICORUM BOUDEWIJN BOUCKAERT: VRANK EN VRIJ 3, 4–12
(J. De Mot ed., 2012).
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other fields of fiduciary law.320 By preventing private ordering, U.S. courts
have taken a more active role in setting directors’ standards of conduct than
have U.K. courts, which have tended to leave standard setting to other actors.
Under the common law, U.K. courts respected company decisions to craft
exceptions to the fiduciary requirement for undivided loyalty in their
charters. Under contemporary law, they apply similar exceptions enshrined
in statute. This difference in judges’ willingness to articulate rules may
reflect varying perceptions among judges about their roles, with Delaware
judges, trained in the legal-realist tradition, more comfortable with an
explicitly lawmaking role.321 This difference may also reflect Delaware
judges’ greater familiarity with “model” or “best” business practices or
greater confidence in their ability to identify those practices. It may also
reflect U.S. judges’ concerns about the ability of shareholders to protect their
own interests when asked to adopt exceptions in their charters, concerns that
are, or at least were, less salient in the United Kingdom given institutional
investors’ historically stronger influence over corporate managers.322
E. Interactions with Statute
This Article’s analysis illustrates the importance of statute and other
regulation for governing self-dealing. In the 1920s, so undemanding had the
no-conflict rule become in the United Kingdom that Parliament imposed a
mandatory disclosure rule on interested directors.323 In the 1980s, the British
Parliament adopted ad hoc legislative reforms, plugging some of the gaps
still left by the no-conflict rule. These rules did not impose duties on
directors. They generally required disclosure, with shareholder approval, for
particular types of self-dealing transactions, including the payment of
compensation, loans, and some “substantial” property transactions.324
Parliament also gave courts broad discretion to award remedies protecting
minority shareholders from “unfairly prejudicial” conduct by controlling
shareholders.325 In the 2006 reforms, the Companies Act carried over these
statutory provisions.326 U.K. stock exchange listing rules also impose limits,
requiring disinterested shareholder approval of “related party” transactions
by listed companies, other than those in the ordinary course of business or

320. See Tuch, supra note 293, at 354 (arguing that U.K. courts have been more willing
than U.S. courts, in a range of areas, to allow financial institutions to contractually alter or
disclaim their fiduciary duties).
321. For a fuller discussion of how American legal realism may influence corporate law
judicial opinion writing and decision-making, see Edward B. Rock, Corporate Law Doctrine
and the Legacy of American Legal Realism, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 2019, 2029–52 (2015).
322. See John Armour et al., The Evolution of Hostile Takeover Regimes in Developed and
Emerging Markets: An Analytical Framework, 52 HARV. INT’L L.J. 219, 265–66 (2011);
Tuch, supra note 198, at 1489–96.
323. See supra notes 167–71 and accompanying text.
324. See Companies Act 1985, c. 6, §§ 320–322 (Eng.).
325. Companies Act 1980, c. 22, § 75 (Eng.).
326. See Companies Act 2006, c. 46, §§ 188–225 (Eng.) (transactions involving directors);
id. §§ 994–996 (unfairly prejudicial conduct).

994

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 88

beneath certain size thresholds.327 These rules lend rigor to the regulation of
many self-dealing transactions, but they do not change the preceding analysis
of fiduciary law.328
In the United Kingdom, the no-conflict rule also regulates conflicts other
than self-dealing. In particular, it applies to the exploitation of property,
information, and opportunity.329 Although the no-conflict rule continues to
govern these types of conflicts, in 2006, Parliament added a new exception
permitting directors to give advance approval to conflicts.330 Much as it does
when considering self-dealing transactions, the law turns to neutral directors
to police conflicts of interest, creating an exception that is likely to be widely
used.
CONCLUSION
Scholars have long disagreed on whether the no-conflict or fairness rule
more effectively governs self-dealing. What they have agreed on is that the
rules operate differently, to different effect. However, in corporate law these
fiduciary rules are remarkably similar in operation, and neither is selfevidently stricter, more pragmatic, or better calibrated to distinguish between
beneficial and harmful self-dealing. Both require strict loyalty, and both are
subject to exceptions allowing corporate fiduciaries to opt out of this
requirement. Directors under both regimes may invoke similar exceptions—
and have routinely done so. By tasking neutral directors with policing selfdealing, both regimes enable nuanced, commercially sensitive responses to
self-dealing. This finding sheds light on the historical understanding of U.S.
corporate law, significantly complicating the view that the availability of
fairness as a cleansing device has eroded the rigor of corporate fiduciary law
or undermined its deterrence force. It suggests that proof of fairness matters
far less than commentators have generally assumed, precisely because of its
rigor, making it less appealing to interested directors than other cleansing
devices. Scholars and policymakers alike ought to focus not on the false
choice between no conflict and fairness but rather on the best use of
exceptions, on what they require, and how fiduciaries use them.

327. See FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., LISTING RULES, at LR 11, https://www.handbook.
fca.org.uk/handbook/LR.pdf [https://perma.cc/2Q67-RMG6]. As to the definition of “related
party,” see id. at LR 11.1.4–11.1.5.
328. For a fuller comparative analysis of nonfiduciary rules applying to self-dealing
transactions, see Luca Enriques, The Law of Company Directors’ Self-Dealing: A
Comparative Analysis, 2 INT’L & COMP. CORP. L.J. 297 (2000).
329. Companies Act 2006, c. 46, § 175(1)–(2) (Eng.). This rule is expressed not to apply
to self-dealing transactions. Id. § 175(3).
330. The no-conflict rule “is not infringed . . . if the matter has been authorized by the
directors.” Id. § 175(4)(b), (5). This exception applies to private companies unless they opt
out and to public companies if they opt in, generally speaking. See id. § 175(5). The exception
does not encompass ratification, which in the United Kingdom occurs after, rather than before,
self-dealing has occurred.
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APPENDIX A
Approvals of Related Party Transactions
Approval Required by
Board of directors only
Audit committee only
Audit committee and/or a majority of the
independent and disinterested members of the
board only
Both the nominating and corporate governance
committee and audit committee only
Independence committee only
Corporate governance committee only
Corporate governance and nominating committee
only
Corporate governance and public policy
committee only
Conflicts committee only
Total

Number
4
60
13
1
1
5
7
1
1
93
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APPENDIX B
Companies in Sample
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Acceleron Pharma Inc. (NasdaqGM:XLRN)
Amgen Inc. (NasdaqGS:AMGN)
Amyris, Inc. (NasdaqGS:AMRS)
Arsanis, Inc. (NasdaqGM:ASNS)
Aspen Technology, Inc. (NasdaqGS:AZPN)
Assembly Biosciences, Inc. (NasdaqCM:ASMB)
Autoliv, Inc. (NYSE:ALV)
Baker Hughes, a GE company (NYSE:BHGE)
Bank of America Corporation (NYSE:BAC)
BankUnited, Inc. (NYSE:BKU)
BG Staffing, Inc. (AMEX:BGSF)
BioLife Solutions, Inc. (NasdaqCM:BLFS)
Blueprint Medicines Corporation (NasdaqGS:BPMC)
Bruker Corporation (NasdaqGS:BRKR)
Cambrex Corporation (NYSE:CBM)
Care.com, Inc. (NYSE:CRCM)
Central Garden & Pet Company (NasdaqGS:CENT)
CF Industries Holdings, Inc. (NYSE:CF)
Ciena Corporation (NYSE:CIEN)
Cocrystal Pharma, Inc. (NasdaqCM:COCP)
Conformis, Inc. (NasdaqGS:CFMS)
Cytosorbents Corporation (NasdaqCM:CTSO)
Devon Energy Corporation (NYSE:DVN)
DexCom, Inc. (NasdaqGS:DXCM)
Dicerna Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (NasdaqGS:DRNA)
Digi International Inc. (NasdaqGS:DGII)
E*TRADE Financial Corporation (NasdaqGS:ETFC)
Entergy Corporation (NYSE:ETR)
Fortive Corporation (NYSE:FTV)
Fox Factory Holding Corp. (NasdaqGS:FOXF)
FTD Companies, Inc. (NasdaqGS:FTD)
GCP Applied Technologies Inc. (NYSE:GCP)
General Finance Corporation (NasdaqGM:GFN)
Hamilton Beach Brands Holding Company (NYSE:HBB)
HealthEquity, Inc. (NasdaqGS:HQY)
Hemispherx Biopharma, Inc. (AMEX:HEB)
Immersion Corporation (NasdaqGS:IMMR)
Imperva, Inc. (NasdaqGS:IMPV)
Infrastructure and Energy Alternatives, Inc. (NasdaqCM:IEA)
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40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
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Inphi Corporation (NYSE:IPHI)
Invuity, Inc. (NasdaqGM:IVTY)
Iron Mountain Incorporated (NYSE:IRM)
J. C. Penney Company, Inc. (NYSE:JCP)
K2M Group Holdings, Inc. (NasdaqGS:KTWO)
Kala Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (NasdaqGS:KALA)
LCI Industries (NYSE:LCII)
LeMaitre Vascular, Inc. (NasdaqGM:LMAT)
Liberty Expedia Holdings, Inc. (NasdaqGS:LEXE.A)
Loews Corporation (NYSE:L)
Loxo Oncology, Inc. (NasdaqGM:LOXO)
Malibu Boats, Inc. (NasdaqGM:MBUU)
Moleculin Biotech, Inc. (NasdaqCM:MBRX)
MongoDB, Inc. (NasdaqGM:MDB)
Office Depot, Inc. (NasdaqGS:ODP)
Oncobiologics, Inc. (NasdaqCM:ONS)
Oracle Corporation (NYSE:ORCL)
Parsley Energy, Inc. (NYSE:PE)
Party City Holdco Inc. (NYSE:PRTY)
PetIQ, Inc. (NasdaqGS:PETQ)
Pinnacle Foods Inc. (NYSE:PF)
Pitney Bowes Inc. (NYSE:PBI)
PriceSmart, Inc. (NasdaqGS:PSMT)
Pure Storage, Inc. (NYSE:PSTG)
Rapid7, Inc. (NasdaqGM:RPD)
Resonant Inc. (NasdaqCM:RESN)
Revolution Lighting Technologies, Inc. (NasdaqCM:RVLT)
Roadrunner Transportation Systems, Inc. (NYSE:RRTS)
Rocket Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (NasdaqGM:RCKT)
Salem Media Group, Inc. (NasdaqGM:SALM)
SELLAS Life Sciences Group, Inc. (NasdaqCM:SLS)
SemGroup Corporation (NYSE:SEMG)
SendGrid, Inc. (NYSE:SEND)
Senomyx, Inc. (NasdaqGM:SNMX)
Seres Therapeutics, Inc. (NasdaqGS:MCRB)
SharpSpring, Inc. (NasdaqCM:SHSP)
SJW Group (NYSE:SJW)
Social Reality, Inc. (NasdaqCM:SRAX)
Soleno Therapeutics, Inc. (NasdaqCM:SLNO)
SP Plus Corporation (NasdaqGS:SP)
Spectrum Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (NasdaqGS:SPPI)
SPX Corporation (NYSE:SPXC)
Summer Infant, Inc. (NasdaqCM:SUMR)
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83. Synaptics Incorporated (NasdaqGS:SYNA)
84. Synopsys, Inc. (NasdaqGS:SNPS)
85. T2 Biosystems, Inc. (NasdaqGM:TTOO)
86. Targa Resources Corp. (NYSE:TRGP)
87. TCP Capital Corp. (NasdaqGS:TCPC)
88. The Walt Disney Company (NYSE:DIS)
89. TSR, Inc. (NasdaqCM:TSRI)
90. Ubiquiti Networks, Inc. (NasdaqGS:UBNT)
91. United States Steel Corporation (NYSE:X)
92. Valeritas Holdings, Inc. (NasdaqCM:VLRX)
93. Viad Corp (NYSE:VVI)
94. VirnetX Holding Corp (AMEX:VHC)
95. Voyager Therapeutics, Inc. (NasdaqGS:VYGR)
96. Waste Management, Inc. (NYSE:WM)
97. Welltower Inc. (NYSE:WELL)
98. Xilinx, Inc. (NasdaqGS:XLNX)
99. Xtant Medical Holdings, Inc. (AMEX:XTNT)
100. Zayo Group Holdings, Inc. (NYSE:ZAYO)
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